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ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE AND
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
Edward L. Rubin & Joanna K. Sax*

One of the most controversial issues in administrative law, the use of guidance, is
exemplified by the regulation of one of the most controversial areas in modern
society: genetically modified (GM) food. The appropriate use of guidance versus
notice and comment rulemaking is a much-debated issue in administrative law.
While agency officials generally assert that they are using guidance to express an
agency’s thoughts about how to comply with a specific statutory provision or agency
rule, the practical consequence is that the regulated party will hesitate to disobey,
even if it believes that the guidance goes beyond the requirements of the statute or
rule. The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulation of GM food through a
guidance document provides a prime example of this effect: the document
recommends a premarket review process that the FDA describes as voluntary for
firms attempting to bring a new product to market. The reality is that regulated
parties feel compelled to comply. This is a controversial and questionable result
because many types of genetic modifications are well understood and pose no safety
issues; the scientific consensus is that GM foods currently available are as safe as
non-GM foods. This situation raises the central issue addressed by this Article: how
to determine whether an agency is appropriately using guidance, or whether the
agency should be required to use notice and comment rulemaking. After discussing
why the current theoretical approaches¾interpretation and bindingness¾are
inadequate to solve this problem, this Article proposes a new theoretical framework
in which to answer this question of public controversy to determine when informal
rulemaking with notice and comment is advantageous and even required by the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). This new theoretical framework is then
applied to the controversial issue of GM food.

*
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most extensively debated issues in administrative law is whether
administrative agencies are appropriately complying with the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) in their use of guidance documents. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is primarily responsible for the safety and labeling of all food
sold in the marketplace for human consumption. Currently, the FDA uses a guidance
document to carry out this function for genetically modified (GM) foods.1 In other
words, one of the most controversial techniques in administrative law is being used
to govern one of the most controversial practices in modern technology.2

1.
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter FDA 1992 Guidance Document].
2.
Regarding the controversy surrounding GM food, see, e.g., CARY FUNK &
BRIAN KENNEDY, THE NEW FOOD FIGHTS: U.S. PUBLIC DIVIDES OVER FOOD SCIENCE (2016),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2016/12/23173602/PS_2016.12.01_Food-Science_FINAL.pdf;
MCKAY JENKINS, FOOD FIGHT: GMOS AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN DIET 17–19 (2017);
BILL LAMBRECHT, DINNER AT THE NEW GENE CAFÉ: HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING IS
CHANGING WHAT WE EAT, HOW WE LIVE, AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF FOOD 179–311
(2001); MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE
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This Article reconsiders the current framework in order to shed light on
both the substance and procedure of GM regulation.3 In particular, this Article uses
the controversial nature of the subject matter that the FDA has chosen to regulate by
guidance as an opportunity to reconsider the guidance technique in general. At the
same time, this Article explores the effect of the FDA’s decision to regulate by
guidance and asks how the GM technology itself and public attitudes about GM use
have been affected by reliance on this controversial regulatory method.4
It is not surprising that the FDA decided to regulate GM food by guidance.
Guidance provides a way to regulate controversial subjects without exposing an
agency to the full force of public backlash.5 The subject of GM food elicits strong
reactions from the general public.6 Because most scientists regard the public reaction
to GM food as irrational,7 there are some good arguments for the strategy that the
FDA has adopted. But an agency’s use of guidance to fly under the radar of public
controversy is one of the main reasons why the use of guidance has itself been
controversial.
This Article argues that the present situation represents one controversy too
many. Administrative guidance has been controversial particularly because it
enables an agency to promulgate rules without resorting to the notice and comment
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 34–38 (2009); DAVID
VOGEL, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 73–91 (2012).
3.
See John P. Holdron et al., Improving Transparency and Ensuring Continued
Safety in
Biotechnology, WHITE HOUSE
(July 5, 2015, 2:57
PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/02/improving-transparency-andensuring-continued-safety-biotechnology.
4.
Id. The time is particularly relevant given that the U.S. government is halfway
through a five-year study to reevaluate the regulatory process for GM food.
5.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern Administrative
Procedure: The Case for De Novo Review, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 48 (2016) (the use of
guidance allows agencies to expand their power and avoid legal constraints on their actions);
James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of
Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating
Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 130–34 (1994) (agencies can use
guidance to circumvent oversight by both courts and elected officials); Nina A.
Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 407–08 (2007) (guidance does not expose an agency to the same level of judicial
or political scrutiny as adoption of a rule); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and
Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166 (2000) (guidance
avoids the scrutiny to which rulemaking is subject). Mendelson notes: “The prospect of
‘compliance for less’ is almost certainly among the reasons that agencies use guidance
documents rather than go through the effort of notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Mendelson,
supra, at 408.
6.
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS:
EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS, at xiii (2016) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], http://nap.edu/23395
(“In carrying out this study, the committee members and I were well aware of the
controversial nature of genetic engineering in the United States and globally.”).
7.
In effect, science denial from the left parallels the rejection of evolution and
anthropogenic climate change from the right. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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rulemaking procedure established by the APA.8 Agencies justify the issuance of
guidance by various means, but the most prominent is that it falls within an
exception established by the APA for interpretive rules.9 The existing criteria for
determining whether a rule is truly interpretive are whether it truly interprets the
language of the controlling statute and whether it has binding legal force.10 This
Article suggests that an additional criterion for determining the legal validity of
guidance—one that might possibly replace the existing tests—is whether the subject
matter of the rule is sufficiently controversial to elicit broad input from both
interested parties and the general public. In that case, the standard and well-accepted
method of notice and comment rulemaking should be used instead.
The marketing of GM food products certainly satisfies this public
controversy criterion. This Article further argues that providing a forum for public
debate through the notice and comment procedure, rather than attempting to
circumvent or foreclose that debate through the use of guidance, would have
beneficial effects for the GM food controversy itself. First, it would educate the
public about the scientific findings regarding GM food and possibly decrease the
resistance to its use. Members of the public may have concerns about GM food
simply because of its extensive regulation; in other words, such regulation leads to
the perception that GM food must be dangerous.11 Second, it would allow a broader
range of voices from within the GM industry to be heard, thereby enabling small,
innovative firms to compete more effectively with the large, somewhat stodgy
agricultural giants that currently dominate the field.12 This is not to say that there is
no place in modern government for expert decision-making that is insulated from
public input, but rather that the choice between that approach and others that involve
public debate should be based on principled considerations, not on the convenience
of an agency or its comfortable relationship with the leading firms in the field that
it regulates.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the scientific basis of GM techniques
and public understanding of those techniques. Part II describes the current legal
regulation of GM food, particularly the FDA’s use of a guidance document to
regulate GM food products. Part III then discusses the use of guidance in
administrative law in general, including the existing criteria of interpretation and
legal bindingness, and the proposed criterion of public controversy. Finally, Part IV
applies the discussion of guidance to the FDA’s regulation of GM food. By using a
practical example such as the FDA’s regulation of GM food to illustrate the

8.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
9.
Id. § 553 (b)(A). See infra notes 157–161 and accompanying text.
10.
See infra Section I.B.
11.
See Peter M. Wiedemann & Holger Schutz, The Precautionary Principle and
Risk Perception: Experimental Studies in the EMF Area, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 402,
402–05 (2005).
12.
See, e.g., Biotechnology Consultations on Food from GE Plant Varieties, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fdcc/?set=Biocon (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017) (showing 73 submissions from Monsanto and 2 from Okanagan Specialty
Fruits, suggesting large agricultural giants dominate the field).
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controversy criterion, this Article provides an analysis that can be extrapolated to
the proper use of guidance in other regulated areas.

I. THE SCIENCE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
A. Biotechnology and the Food Supply
People have been systematically altering the genetic composition of the
food they eat for thousands of years.13 Many of the plant and animal products that
appear in even the earliest historical records resulted from centuries, if not millennia,
of selective breeding and vary greatly from anything that could be found in nature.14
Take one notable example: corn, or maize—now the world’s leading source of
human and domesticated-animal nutrition—cannot propagate without human
intervention.15 It was so extensively modified that the original plant from which it
was developed, a form of grass called teosinte, was not identified until recent
times.16
These selective-breeding techniques have achieved both superficial and
substantive advantages. A superficial advantage might be a better-looking fruit or
vegetable. A substantive advantage might be increased resistance to a particular pest
or inhibition of a particular stress pathway. Historically, these breeding techniques
combined two or more genes of interest (known as stacking) from wild relatives into
the domesticated crop to confer such traits.17 By the 20th century, scientists were
able to employ a variety of techniques—such as hybridization, chemical
mutagenesis, or irradiation—to alter the genetic profile of a particular crop and

13.
NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 65 (“People have been domesticating plants for
at least 10,000 years.”).
14.
ROBERT W. ALLARD, PRINCIPLES OF PLANT BREEDING 24–68 (2d ed. 1999);
NINA FEDEROFF & NANCY MARIE BROWN, MENDEL IN THE KITCHEN: A SCIENTIST’S VIEW OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 23–26 (2004); SUE HUBBELL, SHRINKING THE CAT: GENETIC
ENGINEERING BEFORE WE KNEW ABOUT GENES 121–54 (2001); ROGER J. WOOD & VITEZSLAV
OREL, GENETIC PREHISTORY IN SELECTIVE BREEDING: A PRELUDE TO MENDEL (2001)
(development of domestic sheep in Europe through selective breeding); John Doebley,
Mapping the Genes that Made Maize, 8 TRENDS GENETICS 302 (1992); Hugh H. Iltis, From
Teosinte to Maize: The Catastrophic Sexual Transformation, 222 SCIENCE 886 (1983).
15.
See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 66.
16.
See FEDEROFF & BROWN, supra note 14, at 32–41; HUBBELL, supra note 14, at
11–12; PAUL C. MANGELSDORF, CORN: ITS ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND IMPROVEMENT 21–26
(1974); CORN: HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND PRODUCTION 7–15 (C. Wayne Smith et al. eds.,
2004).
17.
Natalie Weber et al., Crop Genome Plasticity and Its Relevance to Food and
Feed Safety of Genetically Engineered Breeding Stacks, 160 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1842, 1842
(2012); see also Pocket K No. 42: Stacked Traits in Biotech Crops, INT’L SERV. FOR
ACQUISITION
AGRI-BIOTECH
APP.,
http://isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/42/default.asp (last visited Dec. 6, 2017)
(“Gene stacking refers to the process of combining two or more genes of interest into a single
plant. . . . Compared to mono-trait crop varieties, stacks offer broader agronomic
enhancements that allow farmers to meet their needs under complex farming conditions.”).
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select for desired traits.18 However, these were all large-scale mutagenic techniques,
which means that the seeds may contain hundreds to thousands of completely
unknown or uncharacterized mutations.19 Even with large-scale and unknown
mutations, the resulting crops that make it through the commercialization process
are safe.20 Mutations that lead to chromosomal rearrangements, for example, often
affect the plant’s fertility and thus lead to its disappearance. Those plants that
survive can be readily tested for well-known allergens or toxins.21 According to
well-respected scientists, “thus far, there is no evidence that a random genomic
change in a crop has ever resulted in a novel safety issue, even when new alleles or
genes were created.”22
The next stage of GM developments was the use of rDNA techniques to
alter crops.23 Beginning in the 1970s, scientists were able to use the momentous
discoveries about biological heredity achieved in the preceding century to emulate
the biological processes of genetic inheritance in a laboratory setting.24 Paul Berg’s
laboratory produced the first rDNA in bacteria in 1972.25 Shortly thereafter,
scientists learned how to synthesize human protein from a transgenic bacterium.26
18.
NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 67 (“DNA mutation is relatively rare in nature,
but scientists found that they could use chemicals or radiation to induce mutations in DNA at
a much greater frequency.” (internal citations omitted)).
19.
Frank Hartung & Joachim Schiemann, Precise Plant Breeding Using New
Genome Editing Techniques: Opportunities, Safety and Regulation in the EU, 78 PLANT J.
742, 742 (2014).
20.
Gregory Conko et al., A Risk-Based Approach to the Regulation of Genetically
Engineered Organisms, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 493, 494 (2016).
21.
One reason is the commercialization process where deleterious changes will
impact fertility as well as the ability to test for well-known allergens and toxins. Weber, et
al., supra note 17, at 1848–49 (discussing why neither large-scale mutations during breeding
nor genetic engineering techniques cause safety issues).
22.
Id. at 1849.
23.
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) is a laboratory technique used to create the coding
regions of a gene. See NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 68–69; see also Conko et al., note 20, at
497.
24.
See Paul Berg & Janet E. Mertz, Personal Reflections on the Origins and
Emergence of Recombinant DNA Technology, 184 GENETICS 9, 9 (2010).
Although the emergence of recombinant DNA technology was
transformational in its impact, the tools and procedures that were the keys
to its development largely emerged as enhancements and extensions of
existing knowledge, i.e., they were evolutionary, not revolutionary, in
nature. What was novel was the numerous ways in which many
investigators applied these technologies for analyzing and modifying gene
structure and the organization of complex genomes.
Id.
25.
David A. Jackson, Robert H. Symons & Paul Berg, Biochemical Method for
Inserting New Genetic Information into DNA of Simian Virus 40: Circular SV40 DNA
Molecules Containing Lambda Phage Genes and Glactose Operon of Escherichia Coli, 69
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2904, 2904–09 (1972). Other laboratories were also working on
similar experiments. See Berg & Mertz, supra note 24, at 11–14.
26.
Berg & Mertz, supra note 24, at 12–13 (describing the creation of
recombinant DNA in vitro).
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These discoveries led to major advances in our ability to control genetic processes,
including the ability to create transgenic mice that mimic human diseases and
ailments, sequence entire genomes, produce genetically engineered human insulin,
clone DNA, and clone animals—e.g., Dolly.27 At the end of the twentieth century
came perhaps one of the greatest scientific achievements in the entire field: the
complete sequencing of the human genome.28
The modern biotechnology industry is based on these discoveries.29
Equally essential to the growth of this industry was a legal development—the ability
of private parties to patent the techniques used to create rDNA.30 These patents
provide the basis for biotechnology companies and many other types of firms,
including large segments of the agriculture firms discussed later in this Article.
As the science of controlling genetic processes advanced, and the legal
authority to profit from applications of this science became established, concerns
arose about the application of the new technology.31 Perhaps the greatest concern,
expressed by Paul Berg and others, was that the manipulation of E. coli (and other
bacterium that naturally exist in the human gut) could produce oncogenic or other
biohazardous molecules and could end up infecting people—first laboratory
personnel and then the general public.32 In response, an 11-member committee was
formed, with Paul Berg as chair, which formally communicated concerns about
potential biohazards of genetic modification in a published letter in 1974.33 In
October 1974, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) responded to this letter by
27.
See, e.g., Rudolf Jaenisch & Beatrice Mintz, Simian Virus 40 DNA Sequences
in DNA of Healthy Adult Mice Derived from Preimplantation Blastocysts Injected with Viral
DNA, 71 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1250, 1250–54 (1974); Masashi Kitazawa, Rodrigo
Medeiros & Frank M. LaFerla, Transgenic Mouse Models of Alzheimer Disease: Developing
a Better Model as a Tool for Therapeutic Interventions, 18 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL
DESIGN 1131, 1132 (2012); I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult
Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE 810, 810–13 (1997) (describing Dolly); Press Release,
Genentech, First Successful Laboratory Production of Human Insulin Announced (Sept. 6,
1978),
https://www.gene.com/media/press-releases/4160/1978-09-06/first-successfullaboratory-production-o.
28.
All About the Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/10001772/all-about-the—human-genome-project-hgp/
(last
updated Oct. 1, 2015). On the political setting on this effort, see VICTOR K. MCELHENY,
DRAWING THE MAP OF LIFE: INSIDE THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (2010).
29.
Berg & Mertz, supra note 24, at 15.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 13, 15; Paul Berg et al., Letter to the Editor, Potential Biohazards of
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 SCIENCE 303, 303 (1974) [hereinafter Potential
Biohazards]; Paul Berg et al., Letter to the Editor, NAS Ban on Plasmid Engineering, 250
NATURE 175 (1974); Roger B. Dworkin, Science, Society and the Expert Town Meeting: Some
Comments on Asilomar, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1471–72 (1978); Glenn Davis Stone, Both
Sides Now: Fallacies in the Genetic Modification Wars, Implications for Developing
Countries, and Anthropological Perspectives, 43 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 611 (2002).
32.
See Berg et al., Potential Biohazards, supra note 31.
33.
Berg & Mertz, supra note 24, at 16; Berg et al., Potential Biohazards, supra
note 31 (requesting the NIH to create an advisory committee).
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creating the Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee (RAC),
which in turn, established an oversight process for DNA research.34
Over time, researchers have become more knowledgeable and comfortable
with rDNA technology. To date, not a single reported public health incident has
occurred despite millions of laboratory experiments with rDNA.35 With experience
and knowledge, the guidelines for working with rDNA have evolved over time.36
During this same period of time, the potential advantages of this technology have
become apparent. Application of modern molecular biology to the clinical setting is
associated with major advances in the detection, prevention, and treatment of
diseases, such as Herceptin and Tamoxifen for the treatment of breast cancer and
anti-CD20 antibody for treatment of lymphoma.37
As biomedical research advanced our understanding of molecular
mechanisms, plant biologists used this knowledge to develop new agricultural
products through genetic modification.38 In other words, they were able to achieve
34.
The guidelines were published in the Federal Register. Recombinant DNA
Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902–27,943 (1976); see also Berg & Mertz, supra note
24, at 16; INST. OF MED. OF NAT. ACADS., OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW OF CLINICAL GENE
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
33
(2014)
[hereinafter
OVERSIGHT
AND
REVIEW],
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18577/oversight-and-review-of-clinical-gene-transferprotocols-assessing-the.
35.
Berg & Mertz, supra note 24, at 16 (“In the over three decades since adoption
of these various regulations for conducting recombinant DNA research, many millions of
experiments have been performed without reported incident. No documented hazard to public
health has ever been attributable to the applications of recombinant DNA technology.”); see
also OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, supra note 34, at 29.
Many original uncertainties have been replaced by scientific clarity, and
fears have been alleviated by decades of experience. Some of the early
concerns about gene therapy, such as the perceived danger of creating
transmissible pathogens, accidental germ-line modification, and
unspecified xenogeneic dangers, have not been verified by clinical
experience [citation omitted]. In general, risks that gene transfer might
originally have been thought to pose to third parties and society at large
have been determined to be minimal [citation omitted].
Id. (internal citations omitted).
36.
See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NIH Guidelines for Research
Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Apr.
2016), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/NIH_Guidelines.html; see also Henry I.
Miller, Genetic Engineering Applied to Agriculture Has a Long Row to Hoe, 9 GM CROPS &
FOOD 45, 46–47 (2017) (urging learning from the lessons of the Asilomar conference
regarding creating guidelines for something that may not need guidelines).
37.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY M. COOPER, THE CELL: A MOLECULAR APPROACH, (2d
ed. 2000), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9934/ (“A major milestone in the
rational development of drugs targeted against specific oncogenes was reached in 1998, when
the FDA approved Herceptin for treatment of metastatic breast cancer.”).
38.
NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 72 (“Throughout the 1980s, academic
laboratories and companies set out to produce plants that could be released as commercial
products.”).
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the same sorts of results that had previously been achieved through selective
breeding, hybridization, chemical mutagenesis, or irradiation, but did so
systematically, precisely, and much more rapidly. The predominant technology is
the use of transgenes; that is, the transfer of genetic material from one organism to
another.39 This technology has enabled breeders to introduce genetic material into a
seed that could not have been introduced by previous methods; examples include
the transfer of genes from an insect-killing bacterium into corn plants (Bt corn)40
and the transfer of an herbicide-tolerant gene into a variety of crops.41 In addition,
genetic engineering techniques have been able to overcome the limitations that
afflicted previous breeding methods. Even if previously developed techniques
introduce mutations into the seed’s genome, it is difficult to create a new protein
with a novel biochemical function due to the requirements that proteins must be
properly folded to be active and that they must be advantageous to the organism or
they will be selected out.42 GM technology addresses this limitation.
Over the past 15 years, the arsenal of GM techniques has expanded
enormously.43 For example, the CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short
Palindromic Repeats/Cas (CRISPR-associated)) system is a recently discovered and
applied technique that allows for specific, site-directed mutagenesis.44 By doctoring
39.
See Hartung & Schiemann, supra note 19, at 743.
40.
The Cry protein(s) from an insect were isolated and inserted into crops, e.g.,
corn. This allows the modified corn to have an intrinsic mechanism to fend off the corn-borer
pest. The Cry proteins are effective against pests but are safe for human consumption.
Matthew Niederhuber, Insecticidal Plants: The Tech and Safety of GM Bt Crops, HARV. U.:
SCI. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2015/insecticidal-plants/.
41.
Todd Funke et al., Molecular Basis for the Herbicide Resistance of Roundup
Ready Crops, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13010, 13010 (2006).
Glyphosate-based herbicides, such as Roundup, target the shikimate
pathway enzyme 5-enolpyruvylshikimate 3-phosphate (EPSP) synthase,
the functionality of which is absolutely required for the survival of plants.
Roundup Ready plants carry the gene coding for a glyphosate-insensitive
form of this enzyme, obtained from Agrobacterium sp. strain CP4. Once
incorporated into the plant genome, the gene product, CP4 EPSP synthase,
confers crop resistance to glyphosate.
Id.; see also Hartung & Schiemann, supra note 19, at 742–43.
42.
See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 1847. One of the earliest examples of the
development and commercialization of genetically engineered food was the FlavrSavr
tomato, created by Calgene, Inc. in the 1990s. Ordinary tomatoes, if allowed to ripen on the
vine, become soft by the time they are transported to market; instead, they are picked when
unripe and artificially ripened, which impairs their flavor. The FlavrSavr tomato was
genetically engineered to remain firm longer. Thus it could be vine ripened and transported
to market without becoming soft, preserving the flavor and texture of a tomato that had been
picked directly from the plant. NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 72.
43.
NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 355–78 (describing “an array of genomic
technologies”).
44.
Khaoula Belhaj et al., Plant Genome Editing Made Easy: Targeted
Mutagenesis in Model and Crop Plants Using the CRSIP/Cas System, 9 PLANT METHODS 39,
(2013); Tereza Sovoa et al., Genome Editing with Engineered Nucleases in Economically
Important Animals and Plants: State of the Art in the Research Pipeline, 21 CURRENT ISSUES
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the natural system, scientists can introduce site-specific DNA breaks in a plant
genome and mutate the endogenous DNA.45 Even though some non-directed, offtarget mutations are possible, these can be bred out through development and
commercialization processes.46 Because of the nature of the technique, the
modifications to the DNA “are indistinguishable from those introduced by
conventional breeding and chemical or physical mutagenesis.”47
B. Scientific and Public Responses to GM
At the time that scientists began creating GM crops, government
regulators, independent scientists, and other private parties began to express
concerns that, to some extent, paralleled the concerns expressed when the
technology was first developed.48 These included the possibilities that genetic
manipulations could lead to the increased expression of endogenous toxins or
allergens, or to genetic instability with large-scale insertions, deletions, or other
genetic rearrangements.49 The possibility that a novel toxin or allergen could be
created by genetic instability seemed particularly threatening. Opponents to GM
food issued dire warnings about “Frankenfood” that were rampant—and continue to
be rampant—in the popular press and on the Internet.50
In 2016, after many academic studies over a period of several decades, the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) issued an

MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 41, 41 (2016). The possibilities of this technique may in fact be
momentous when applied to human beings. See JENNIFER A. DOUDNA & SAMUEL STERNBERG,
A CRACK IN CREATION: GENE EDITING AND THE UNTHINKABLE POWER TO CONTROL
EVOLUTION 66–69 (2017); JIM KOZUBEK, MODERN PROMETHEUS: EDITING THE HUMAN
GENOME WITH CRISPR-CAS9, at 10–13 (2016); JOHN PARRINGTON, REDESIGNING LIFE: HOW
GENOME EDITING WILL TRANSFORM THE WORLD (2006). As applied to plants, however, it is
simply a further development of existing GM technology.
45.
Belhaj et. al, supra note 44, at 39–45.
46.
Id. at 39, 45–46.
47.
Id.
48.
See Potential Biohazards, supra note 31.
49.
See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 2, at 55–76, 123–48; ALAN MCHUGHEN,
PANDORA’S PICNIC BASKET: THE POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS
160–81 (2000); POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 33–84; JEFFREY M. SMITH, GENETIC
ROULETTE: THE DOCUMENTED HEALTH RISKS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS 73–79
(2007); VOGEL, supra note 2, at 73–91. See generally Kieran Tuohy, Ian R. Rowland & Paul
C. Rumsby, Biosafety of Marker Genes—The Possibility of DNA Transfer from Genetically
Modified Organisms to the Human Gut Microflora, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS:
ASSESSING SAFETY 110 (Keith T. Atherton ed., 2003).
50.
See JEFF GILMAN & ERIC HEBERLIG, HOW GOVERNMENT GOT INTO YOUR
BACKYARD: SUPERWEEDS, FRANKENFOODS, LAWN WARS AND THE (NONPARTISAN) TRUTH
ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES (2011); see also MICHAEL WALD, FRANKENFOODS: GMO
CONTROVERSY, LIES AND YOUR HEALTH (2014); Jim Hightower, Frankenfood: Corporate
Engineers Tinker Merrily and Dangerously with the DNA of Food (2004),
http://www.utne.com/community/frankenfood; see also STEVEN DRUCKER, ALTERED GENES,
TWISTED TRUTH (2015); SMITH, supra note 49. The term was coined in a 1992 letter to the
New York Times. FEDEROFF & BROWN, supra note 14, at 8.
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extensive report summarizing the research about the safety of GM.51 It concluded
that GM crops pose no greater risk to health, safety, environment, and biodiversity
than crops developed by selective breeding or previously developed means of
induced variation.52 The NAS was equivocal about whether GM crops would
achieve the advantages that their proponents claimed for them, both at present and
in the future,53 but not about the safety of these crops. On that issue, there was a
scientific consensus.54
However, it seems fair to say, that despite the scientific consensus on the
safety of GM food, the public has not been convinced. According to a recent survey
by the Pew Research Center, 39% of Americans believe that GM foods are “worse
for health than foods with no GM ingredients.”55 Public awareness of the issue is
51.
NAS REPORT, supra note 6.
52.
Id. Specific conclusions, stated in terms of genetic engineering (GE) included
the following:
•
“Overall, the committee found no evidence of cause-and-effect relationships
between GE crops and environmental problems[.]” Id. at 154.
•
“[T]he research that has been conducted in studies with animals on chemical
composition of GE food reveals no differences that would implicate a higher
risk to human health from eating GE foods than from eating their non-GE
counterparts.” Id. at 236.
•
“There is some evidence that GE insect-resistant crops have had benefits to
human health by reducing insecticide poisonings and decreasing exposure to
fumonisins.” Id.
•
“On the basis of the research that is available, the committee concludes that
existing GE crops have generally been useful to large-scale farmers of cotton,
soybean, maize and canola. The same GE crops have benefited a number of
smaller-scale famers, but benefits have varied widely across time and space,
and are connected to the institutional context in which the crops have been
deployed. Small-scale farmers were more likely to be successful with GE
crops when they also had access to credit, extension services, and markets and
to government assistance in ensuring an accessible seed price.” Id. at 333.
•
“To contribute to alleviation of hunger in food-insecure populations on and off
farms, more GE crops and GE crop traits will need to be developed in ways
that increase potential yield, protect yield from biotic and abiotic stresses, and
improve nutritional quality. Even if that is accomplished, the ability of GE
crops to alleviate hunger will depend on the social and economic contexts in
which the technology is developed and diffused.” Id. at 334.
53.
See, e.g., id. at 330–31; L. Val Giddings & Henry Miller, US National
Academies Report Misses the Mark, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1226, 1226 (2016).
54.
NAS REPORT, supra note 6, at 236. For confirming views by individual
scientists, see FEDEROFF & BROWN, supra note 14; Chelsea Snell et al., Assessment of the
Health Impact of GM Plant Diets in Long-Term and Multigenerational Animal Feeding
Trials: A Literature Review, 50 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 1134, 1134–35 (2012);
Weber et al., supra note 17, at 1849 (“Thus far, there is no evidence that a random genetic
change in a crop has ever resulted in a novel safety issue, even when new alleles or genes
were created.”).
55.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 3–5. Notable in the Pew Report is the
response that a majority of Americans think that organic food is healthier than conventional
food. A similar result was found in Joanna K. Sax & Neal Doran, Food Labeling and
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relatively high: 29% of Americans report that they have heard “a lot” about GM
foods, while only 19% report that they have heard “nothing at all.”56 However, the
factual content of this awareness is more limited: only half (51%) believe that some
of their food has GM ingredients.57 A large majority of Americans (69%) believe
that GM foods will increase the world’s food supply, and more than half (56%) think
that GM foods will lead to lower prices; the same number who think they are
unhealthy (39%) think that they will “create problems for the environment.”58
A striking aspect of the Pew findings is that, in contrast to attitudes toward
climate change (another leading area of science denial), attitudes toward GM food
are not correlated with political ideology. While those who are worried about climate
change tend to be progressive and democratic, the proportions of Democrats and
Republicans who are greatly concerned or somewhat concerned about GM foods
are—remarkably—almost identical. Those who are greatly concerned comprise
16% of Democrats and 16% of Republicans; those who are somewhat concerned
comprise 39% of Democrats and 34% of Republicans.59 Other possible correlations
are also strikingly absent. Older Americans tend to be less concerned, but only by

Consumer Associations with Health, Safety and Environment, 44 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 630,
633 (2016).
56.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 44.
57.
Id. This is simply false; most foods have GM ingredients. Caroline Young, 7
Most Common Genetically Modified Foods, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2013, 8:28 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/builtlean/diet-and-nutrition_b_4323937.html (“[I]n reality,
much of what we eat on a daily basis is a genetically modified organism (GMO).”).
58.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 46–49. Perhaps one reason for a disconnect
between the scientific consensus and public perception is the existence of a well-funded, antiGMO movement that has spread misinformation and lies about agricultural biotechnology.
See, e.g., Michelle Miller, Who Funds the Grassroots Anti-GMO Movement?, GENETIC
LITERACY PROJECT (Sept. 15, 2016), https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2016/09/15/fundsgrassroots-anti-gmo-movement/; see also William Saletan, Unhealthy Fixation, SLATE, (Jul.
15,
2015,
5:45
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/07/are_gmos_safe_yes_the_
case_against_them_is_full_of_fraud_lies_and_errors.html.
59.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 50. The Pew Study of attitudes toward
climate change found that “[a] substantial majority of Democrats (79%) say there is solid
evidence that the average temperature on earth has been increasing over the past few decades,
and 53% think the earth is warming mostly because of human activity. Among Republicans,
only 38% agree the earth is warming and just 16% say warming is caused by humans.” PEW
RES. CTR., LITTLE CHANGE IN OPINIONS ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING: INCREASING PARTISAN
DIVIDE ON ENERGY POLICIES 3 (2010), http://www.people-press.org/2010/10/27/littlechange-in-opinions-about-global-warming/.
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very slight margins.60 There is no difference on the basis of race.61 Differences on
the basis of family income are slight and seemingly random.62 Those in the lowest
category of educational attainment show the lowest level of concern, but here again,
the differences are slight.63 The one demographic variable that does seem to make a
difference is gender, but even here, the difference appears only among those who
are greatly concerned (20% of women, 12% of men) and not among those who are
somewhat concerned (39% of women, 34% of men).64
Perhaps equally surprising, people’s level of scientific knowledge did not
produce a clearer pattern regarding the perceived dangers of GM food than did the
demographic variables. Pew ranked science knowledge as high, medium, or low
based on a nine-item test.65 While higher levels of knowledge were associated with
a more sanguine view of GM foods’ potential advantages, they did not lead to any
significant difference in views regarding the potential dangers.66 The Pew Study
60.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 53. For the four identified age groups, the
numbers of those who were greatly concerned and those who were somewhat concerned,
respectively, were as follows: 18–29: 18%, 37%; 30–49: 18%, 39%; 50–65: 16%, 40%; and
over 65: 13%, 29%. Id. The variation of any group from the general population, for which the
numbers are 16% and 37%, is clearly slight. Id.
61.
For the three identified racial groups, the number of those who were greatly
concerned and those who were somewhat concerned, respectively, were as follows: White:
16%, 38%; Black: 17%, 31%; Hispanic: 17%, 38%. Id.
62.
Id. For the five identified income categories, the number of those who were
greatly concerned and those who were somewhat concerned, respectively, were as follows:
above $100,000: 17%, 37%; $75,000–$99,999: 16%, 38%; $50,000–$74,999: 23%, 35%;
$30,000–$49,999: 17%, 41%; and under $30,000: 14%, 34%. Id. The one notable outlier is
the 23% greatly concerned for the middle category, but the figure is difficult to interpret
because the categories both above and below it show the typical distribution. The variation
might be significant for a category that was salient to its members, such as race or political
party, but it is hard to imagine that people in this middle-income category are aware of any
difference between them and those who are immediately above and below them in family
income. Moreover, the variation from the mean is quite small when compared to the variation
on climate change on the basis of political affiliation. PEW RES. CTR. supra note 59, at 3–4.
63.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 53. For the four identified education levels,
the number of those who were greatly concerned and those who were somewhat concerned,
respectively, were as follows: postgraduate degree: 17%, 40%; college degree: 22%, 38%;
some college: 17%, 39%; high school or less: 12%, 34%. Id. A future survey study may seek
to understand whether religious beliefs also play a role in public perception.
64.
Id. The reason for this one disparity is far from obvious, although, as the
Report points out, it is consistent with other Pew studies that reveal higher levels of skepticism
about technological advances among women than among men.
65.
For the test questions, see FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 96–99. Two
examples: “Which of the following conditions can be treated effectively by antibiotic
medications?” (choices were viral, fungal, bacterial, or allergic; 44% of the people surveyed
gave the correct answer); “Which gas makes up most of the Earth’s atmosphere?” (only 27%
of the people surveyed gave the correct answer). Id. at 97, 99.
66.
Id. at 61–62. Of those whose science knowledge ranked high, 41% thought
that GM would increase the world’s food supply, as opposed to just 11% for those whose
science knowledge ranked low, and 35% of those with high knowledge thought that GM
would lead to more affordably priced food, as opposed to 13% of those with low knowledge.
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found that Americans generally express confidence in the information provided by
scientists about GM foods: 35% reported that they trusted scientists “a lot,” which
was somewhat more than the number who trusted information provided by small
farm owners (29%), and much more than the number who trusted information
provided by food industry leaders (10%), the news media (9%), or elected officials
(an amazingly low 4%).67 When those who trusted the information “some” (as
opposed to “not too much” or “not at all”) are added, scientists scored 78%, which
seems notably high.68 Small farmers caught up to them,69 but other groups lagged
well behind: 42% for food industry leaders, 45% for the news media, and a sorry
25% for elected officials.70 Oddly, however, this trust in scientists did not lead to an
understanding of their conclusions. While 63% of Americans surveyed thought that
scientists understood the health effects of GM foods “very well” or “fairly well,”71
only 14% of the respondents knew that “almost all” scientists believe that GM foods
are safe to eat.72 Another 28% thought that more than half, but not most of the
scientists, came to this conclusion, while 54% thought that fewer than half the
scientists thought GMs were safe, with 23% believing that “almost none” of the
scientists thought these foods were safe.73

Id. at 57. But the proportions of those who thought that GM foods would create problems for
the environment were considerably closer and went in the opposite direction—19% of highknowledge people thought that GM food would create problems for the environment, as
opposed to 13% of those with low knowledge. Id. And the proportions of those who thought
the GM foods would cause health problems in the general population was virtually the same—
11% as opposed to 12%. Id.
67.
Id. at 61–62. As might be expected, those with higher levels of science
knowledge trusted scientists more than those with lower levels. Id. at 17–18.
68.
Id. at 60–61.
69.
Id. (showing 78% for Americans who trust small farm owners about GM
foods a lot or some).
70.
Id. at 61–62. Somewhat remarkably, given the apparently high levels of trust
in scientifically generated information, Americans view scientists who study food as being
subject to a wide variety of motivations, not all of them associated with reliability. While 81%
said that scientists base their findings on the best-available evidence, and 67% said that
scientists had the public’s best interests in mind, 80% thought that scientists were motivated
by the desire to help “their industries,” 78% thought scientists were motivated by the desire
to advance their careers, and 69% thought scientists were motivated by their political
preferences. Id. at 63. It may be that each of these questions conjured up a plausible image in
the interviewees’ minds, or that the questions led the interviewees to picture two different
kinds of scientists: independent university researchers in response to questions about evidence
and public interest, versus company scientists for questions about industry. See id. at 61–65.
71.
Id. at 60. Only 19%, however, thought that scientists understood the issue
“very well.” Id. This may reflect the sense of uncertainty that accompanies a new technology.
Most scientists would probably agree that the consequences of genetic modification are not
certain. See DOUDNA & STERNBERG, supra note 44, at 116.
72.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 58–59.
73.
Id. at 59. The authors add, “those who view GM foods as worse for health are
especially inclined to say that there is little agreement among scientists about the safety of
GM foods.” Id. They also add, “[p]ast Pew Research Center studies have found a similar
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Consistent with the expressed levels of confidence, most people thought
that scientists should play a major role in public policymaking about GM foods, and
most thought that the general public should play a major role as well.74 Of those who
expressed “a great deal” of concern about GM foods, 78% thought the general public
should play a major role, followed by small farmers (73%), scientists (66%), foodindustry leaders (41%), and in last place again, elected officials (39%).75 Of those
who identified as having some concern about the issue, scientists came in first at
64%, the general public and small farmers were close behind at 61% each, foodindustry leaders scored 43%, and elected officials were again at the bottom, this time
with only 26% believing they should play a major role in policymaking.76 Among
those who were concerned “not too much” or “not at all,” the proportions were
lower, as might be expected. Scientists were again in the lead with 55%, followed
closely by small farm owners with 54%, and the general public with 47%, while
elected officials scored an abysmal 17%.77
To summarize, people trust scientists a great deal both to provide accurate
information and formulate good public policy about the safety of GM food. But
many do not agree with the conclusions that scientists have reached, nor do they
understand that these conclusions represent a consensus in the scientific community.
A significant number of people continue to express strong or fairly strong concerns
about the issue. However, the source of this concern is unclear because it is not
correlated with political views, age, race, income, or scientific knowledge, and only
moderately correlated with gender, which standing alone, does not have much
explanatory force.78 People also want the general public to play a major role in
making policy, but they do not trust elected officials to either provide accurate
information or to make good policy decisions.

II. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED
FOOD
In response to the concerns raised by scientists, informed observers, and
the general public about the safety of GM food, federal regulators turned their
attention to the subject in the early 1980s.79 They faced at least two complexities in
doing so. The first was the intrinsic complexity that GM food represented the
advancing edge of technological development, so regulators did not possess, and
could not possess, the level of knowledge that is desirable when deploying
government authority to achieve particular results. The second complexity, extrinsic
pattern when it comes to perceptions of scientific consensus and beliefs about climate change
as well as beliefs about evolution.” Id.
74.
Id. at 66.
75.
Id. at 67.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
For a discussion of the complexity of decision-making and how it might relate
to this area, see Joanna K. Sax, Biotechnology and Consumer Decision-Making, 47 SETON
HALL L. REV. 433, 448–454 (2017).
79.
See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302 (June 26, 1986).
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to the substantive issue but nonetheless quite real, was that questions regarding the
safety of GM foods fell within the purview of at least three different federal
agencies: the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), a cabinet-level
executive agency that regulates the production and marketing of products grown on
farms; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a non-cabinet executive agency
that regulates actual and potential threats to human health resulting from disruption
of the environment; and the FDA, a unit of another cabinet agency—the Department
of Health and Human Services—that regulates the safety of all food and cosmetic
products sold for human use.80
The response to these complexities, quite reasonably, was to convene
representatives of the three agencies, and other agencies whose mission might be
relevant, to develop a “Coordinated Framework” for addressing the safety issue
regarding GM foods. This Part describes and discusses the Coordinated Framework.
It begins with an overview, then addresses the role of each of the three agencies
involved, and ends with an account of the FDA guidance that functions within the
Coordinated Framework but serves as the decisive set of rules for GM foods.
Because this Article focuses on the role of the FDA, the actions of the other agencies,
although not irrelevant to the discussion, will be dealt with summarily and largely
for the purpose of providing the context for the FDA decision.
A. The Coordinated Framework
Once the Coordinated Framework was developed, it was published in the
Federal Register in preliminary form and opened to public comment for a 60-day
period.81 The document declared the intention that “the policies contained herein be
effective immediately.”82 It then stated, “[i]n consideration of comments,
modifications, if any, may be published either in a separate notice or as part of
proposed rulemaking by the involved agencies.”83 After the notice and comment
period, the Framework went through at least two iterations, with the most recent
(and currently applicable) policy promulgated in 1992.
The procedure adopted by the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) was the functional equivalent of rulemaking subject to the notice and
comment requirements of the APA, as will be described in further detail below.84 It
80.
For a description of each agency’s role in the Coordinated Framework, see
How the Federal Government Regulates Biotech Plants, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/sa_regulations/ct_agency_frame
work_roles (last visited May 29, 2018).
81.
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23302 (June 26, 1986).
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
In 1976, Congress established the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to provide the President and others within the
Executive Office of the President with advice on the scientific, engineering,
and technical aspects of the economy, national security, homeland security,
health, foreign relations, the environment, and the technological recovery
and use of resources, among other topics.
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was not itself a rule, however, but a sort of meta-rule that represented a commitment
by the OSTP that it would exercise its discretionary authority in particular ways, and
that the agencies with regulatory authority would exercise that authority by adopting
further rules. Its declared purpose was
[T]o guide the exercise of agencies’ oversight, within the scope
of the authority afforded by statute, to ensure the safety of
planned introductions of biotechnology products into the
environment while not unduly inhibiting the benefits of such
introductions. This approach therefore focuses on the
characteristics and risk posed by the introduction, rather than on
the process by which a product is created.85
The OSTP went on to say that “nothing in this document displaces agencies’ duties
under applicable statutes, nor does this document provide the basis for additional
authority not available to agencies under applicable law. Rather, this document
guides the exercise of discretion within the range of authority left to agencies under
their statutes.”86 As the Coordinated Framework recognized, the principal agencies
responsible for implementing its policies—that is, the EPA, USDA, and FDA—
were operating under the authority of their authorizing statutes that existed at the
time.87 No new legislation was enacted to regulate GM food, and no such legislation
has been enacted since then.88 It was understood that the three agencies would
proceed to exercise their existing authority in accordance with the APA, which both
empowers agencies to make rules and adjudicate cases, and imposes procedural
requirements on the way in which they carry out these basic functions. Each agency
was charged with addressing a different aspect of the issue,89 and each interpreted
its statutory authority, its procedural requirements under the APA, and the terms of
the Coordinated Framework in a different way.90 There is thus some doubt whether
the Coordinated Framework represented true coordination, where the individual
agencies worked together to solve problems through cooperative efforts, or whether
it was simply a means of defining the separate jurisdictions of the agencies,

Office
of
Science
and
Technology
Policy,
WHITE
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/about (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
85.
Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned
Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753-01, 6755.
(Feb. 27, 1992). The OSTP acknowledged that “[j]ust as with traditional breeding techniques,
the production of organisms using new molecular techniques of genetic manipulation may or
may not pose risk, depending on the characteristics of the organism, the target environment,
and the type of application.” Id.
86.
Id. at 6757.
87.
These statutes were as follows: the Plant Protection Act (PPA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 7701–7786 (2012); the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act (FIRA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012); and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21
U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2012).
88.
Conko et al., supra note 20, at 495.
89.
Id. at 495–96.
90.
Id.
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functioning as a sort of treaty that would allow each agency to maintain its
regulatory preserve.
B. The Role of the EPA and USDA
The EPA is responsible, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), for the safety of all pesticides used on agricultural
products.91 The FIFRA establishes a registration procedure by which anyone who
wants to make use of a pesticide must file an application with the EPA documenting
the nature of the product and demonstrating its safety.92 The EPA then evaluates
each application on an individualized basis.93 If it finds the product safe, either
initially or after the applicant has made requested modifications, it issues the
registration.94 The registration is defined as an “order” by the APA, which means
that the EPA’s process for issuing it is considered an “adjudication.” The EPA has
the authority to issue rules providing generalized standards for pesticide approvals,
but thus far it has not done so.
In applying the FIFRA to GM foods, the role recognized by the
Coordinated Framework, the EPA treats GM plants to resist disease as pesticides.95
One of the most important uses of GM is to produce plants that are intrinsically
resistant to pests, which decreases the need for external application of a chemical
pesticide.96 Such modifications, called Plant Incorporated Protectants (PIPs),
achieve their effects by enhancing the natural processes by which plants resist
pests—a technique that is generally regarded by scientists as creating no additional
risk.97 The EPA’s decision to treat PIPs as pesticides means that they are required to
undergo extensive pre-market regulatory review followed by extensive post-market
regulatory compliance, just like the chemical pesticides they are designed to
replace.98

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

7 U.S.C. §§ 136(u), 136a(a).
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(C)–(D).
7 U.S.C. §136a(c)(3)(A).
Id.
Conko et al., supra note 20, at 495–96.
Brian A. Federici, Case Study: Bt Crops, a Novel Mode of Insect Control, in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: ASSESSING SAFETY 164, 164 (Keith T. Atherton ed., 2002);
Ivan E. Gard, Michael F. Treacy & John J. Wrubel, Case Study: Recombinant Baculoviruses
as Microbial Pest Agents, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: ASSESSING SAFETY 201, 201–
02 (Keith T. Atherton ed., 2002); Hector Quemada, Case Study: Virus-Resistant Crops, in
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: ASSESSING SAFETY 219, 222 (Keith T. Atherton ed., 2002).
97.
The EPA treats a PIP as a pesticide by invoking the “active ingredient”
definition in the FIFRA, which reads, in part: “[I]n the case of a pesticide other than a plant
regulator, defoliant, desiccant, or nitrogen stabilizer, an ingredient which will prevent,
destroy, repel, or mitigate any pest[.]” 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(1). Eleven scientific societies with
expertise in plant breeding provided comments to the EPA that the PIP rule was scientifically
incorrect, stigmatizing, and unwise policy. ROGER N. BEACHY ET AL., APPROPRIATE
OVERSIGHT FOR PLANTS WITH INHERITED TRAITS FOR RESISTANCE TO PESTS 2–3 (1996). The
EPA could have used its discretion sensibly to not treat these plants as pesticides.
98.
In addition to the regulatory requirements that result from the characterization
of plants that have been genetically modified to resist disease as pesticides, the product must
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The USDA is authorized by the Plant Protection Act (PPA) to regulate
plant pests.99 It carries out this responsibility through the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS), a component agency.100 Unlike the EPA, APHIS does
not rely on the statutory provisions alone to make determinations regarding the
status of plant pests, but rather it has issued several regulations, or rules, to ramify
the statutory language and direct its individualized determinations.101 The principal
regulation defines a “regulated article,” that is, something subject to APHIS’s full
prior approval requirements, as:
[a]ny organism which has been altered or produced through genetic
engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector or
vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa designated in §340.2 and
meets the definition of plant pest.102

be labeled as such. 7 U.S.C. § 136(p). The label itself can create confusion for consumers;
most members of the public are unlikely to understand what it means to label a piece of fruit
as a pesticide. See, e.g., Conko et al., supra note 20, at 495 fig.1 (using Honey Sweet Plum as
an example of how the current framework leads to pesticide labeling of a pest-resistant GM
fruit).
99.
7 U.S.C. § 7711. The Act defines a “plant pest” as:
any living stage of any of the following that can directly or indirectly
injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product: (A)
A protozoan; (B) A nonhuman animal; (C) A parasitic plant; (D) A
bacterium; (E) A fungus; (F) A virus or viroid; (G) An infectious agent or
other pathogen; (H) Any article similar to or allied with any of the articles
specified in the preceding subparagraphs.
7 U.S.C. § 7702(14).
100.
7 U.S.C. § 7701.
101.
Regulations to Improve Management and Oversight of Certain Regulated
Articles, Pub. L. No. 110–234, tit. X, § 10204, 122 Stat. 1343 (2008); Pub. L. No. 110–246,
tit. X, §10204, 122 Stat. 1664, 2105 (2008).
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after the date of
enactment of this Act [June 18, 2008], the Secretary [of Agriculture]
shall— ‘‘(1) take action on each issue identified in the document
entitled ‘Lessons Learned and Revisions under Consideration for
APHIS’ Biotechnology Framework’, dated October 4, 2007; and
‘‘(2) as the Secretary considers appropriate, promulgate regulations
to improve the management and oversight of articles regulated under
the Plant Protection Act.
7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
102.
7 CFR § 340.1 (2018). The remainder of the definition goes on to say:
or is an unclassified organism and/or an organism whose classification is
unknown, or any product which contains such an organism, or any other
organism or product altered or produced through genetic engineering
which the Administrator, determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe
is a plant pest. Excluded are recipient microorganisms which are not plant
pests and which have resulted from the addition of genetic material from
a donor organism where the material is well characterized and contains
only non-coding regulatory regions.
Id.
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This definition turns out to be both over- and underinclusive. Many
genetically engineered plants that have been field tested over the past 30 years have
promoters that contain parts of the genetic sequence of Agrobacterium tumefaciens,
the cause of crown gall disease in plants, or of the cauliflower mosaic virus.103
Because the organisms from which these snippets of transgenes are derived are
considered plant pests, the crop, simply by having a promoter sequence, becomes
subject to review by APHIS. On the other hand, some GM plants are now produced
without any DNA sequences from a known plant pest, and can thus avoid review by
APHIS (although they may be regulated by the EPA and the FDA) even though they
do not include a full-length DNA sequence encoding a protein for that plant pest.104
It is possible that the genetically engineered crop could actually function as a plant
pest, but the APHIS regulations would not apply to it because none of its gene
sequences originated in an organism that would fit into this category.105
In place of a new rule to address the specifics of GM food, APHIS has
issued a series of guidance documents to assist developers and manufacturers to
petition for deregulated status.106 Depending on the intended introduction of the
genetically engineered organism, a developer or manufacturer will have to apply for
notification or permit,107 with notification status being much more limited than the
permit status.108 However, APHIS has an extension process available whereby a
manufacturer can qualify for notification status by essentially piggybacking off of
the data known about a previously deregulated article.109

103.
Conko et al., supra note 20, at 496. A promoter is a noncoding sequence; in
other words, it does not translate to a protein.
104.
Id.
105.
In 2008, APHIS issued a proposed rule to amend the regulations for
genetically engineered organisms that attempted to solve the overinclusiveness problem by
aligning the regulations with the developments in GM technology. Importation, Interstate
Movement, and Release Into the Environment of Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms,
73 Fed. Reg. 60008, 60008 (Oct. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 340). According to
APHIS, 88,300 commenters provided comments on the 2008 proposed rule. Importation,
Interstate Movement, and Release Into the Environment of Certain Genetically Engineered
Organisms, 80 Fed. Reg. 11598, 11598 (Mar. 4, 2015). In 2015, APHIS withdrew this rule.
Id.
106.
Guidance
Documents,
U.S.
DEP’T
AGRIC.,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/sa_guidance_documents
(last
modified July 13, 2017).
107.
BIOTECHNOLOGY
REGULATORY
SERVS.,
NOTIFICATION
(2011),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/notification_guidance_0311.pdf.
108.
However, neither is simple. The guidance for notification is 30 pages long (53
with the appendix), and the guidance to apply for a permit is 44 pages long (93 with the
appendix). See id.; BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SERVICES, PERMIT USER’S GUIDE WITH
SPECIAL
GUIDANCE
FOR
EPERMITS
(2017),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/permit_guidance.pdf.
109.
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., REQUEST TO EXTEND NONREGULATED STATUS FROM A
PREVIOUS DETERMINATION: EXTENSION GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPERS (2016),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/guidance_ext_nonreg.pdf; see also Petitions for
Determination
of
Nonregulated
Status,
U.S.
DEP’T
AGRIC.,
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Congress has now assigned the USDA responsibility for labeling of any
product containing GM food. In July 2016, Congress enacted the National
Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard,110 amending the Agricultural Marketing
Act of 1946111 to assign the USDA responsibility for labeling GM food and preempt
any state or local law that prescribes labels on food indicating that it was produced
with GM technology. The legislation was controversial: opponents, including a wide
range of environmental and proconsumer groups, nicknamed it the DARK Act,
standing for “Deny Americans the Right to Know.”112 In fact, the primary sponsor
of the legislation, Representative Mike Pompeo (R-Kansas), received large
campaign contributions from Koch Industries.113 On the other hand, the legislation
was signed by President Barack Obama, and uniform federal legislation that
preempts the welter of state laws has generally been favored by progressives and
good-government advocates. Ultimately, the test of this statute’s advisability will be
determined by the quality of the legislation that the federal government enacts, and
that determination will be based on matters that remain controversial.114
C. The Role of the FDA
While the EPA and the USDA regulate important aspects of the food
industry and play a major role in determining the extent and manner that GM foods
are produced and distributed, the FDA, under the authority of the Food, Drugs and
Cosmetics Act (FDCA), determines what can be sold as food in the United States
and what cannot.115 In other words, the EPA regulates pesticides used on food plants,
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/permits-notificationspetitions/petitions/petition-status (last visited Aug. 3, 2017) (showing extension petitions).
110.
Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (July 29, 2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 293(a)(1)) (directing the Secretary of the USDA to “establish a national mandatory
bioengineered food disclosure standard with respect to any bioengineered food and any food
that may be bioengineered . . . .” within two years of the date of enactment of this law). This
law allows the USDA to determine the amount of substance within a food product that would
tip the balance in favor of it needing a label. Id. It means, for example, that a cereal product
that only contains a small amount of bioengineered wheat may not be considered as a
bioengineered food product. The law also provides that the label may be a “text, symbol, or
electronic or digital link, but excluding Internet website Uniform Resource Locators not
embedded in the link, with the disclosure option to be selected by the food manufacturer.” Id.
In other words, manufacturers could provide some sort of picture that can be scanned by a
smart phone by the consumer, if the consumer wants to find out if the product contains the
requisite level of bioengineered ingredient.
111.
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1638 (2012).
112.
See JENKINS, supra note 2, at 43.
113.
Id. The Koch Brothers have interests within and around the food industry and
are large supporters of Mike Pompeo. See John Nichols, The Koch Brothers’ Favorite
Congressman will be in Charge of the CIA, NATION (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-koch-brothers-favorite-congressman-will-be-incharge-of-the-cia/.
114.
The USDA sought comments on its proposed labeling rule. USDA Seeks
Comments on Proposed Rule for National Bioengineered Disclosure Standard, U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC.,
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/05/03/usda-seeks-commentsproposed-rule-national-bioengineered-food (last visited May 29, 2018).
115.
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2016).
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and the USDA regulates plant pests that afflict these plants, but the FDA regulates
food itself. In this role, the FDA necessarily determines whether, and under what
conditions, GM foods can be marketed. This role is, of course, recognized by the
Coordinated Framework in its attempt to delineate the overlapping responsibilities
of the three regulatory agencies, various other agencies, and research units of the
federal government.
For GM food, the FDA relies on two provisions of the FDCA: the
adulteration provision (section 402(a)(1)) and the food additives provision (section
409),116 both of which differentiate between a new substance intentionally added to
the food supply and a substance that is generally recognized as safe (GRAS).117

116.
For a description of how these provisions apply, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS: FINAL
VERSION OF THE 2017 UPDATE TO THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 15–16 (2017) [hereinafter COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 2017 UPDATE],
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GEPlants/UCM53731
5.pdf. The Act was amended in 1958 to require that all food additives should undergo
extensive pre-market safety testing, including longitudinal animal studies. Food Additive
Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 2, 72 Stat. 1784, 1784 (Sept. 6, 1958). The Act
defined “food additives” as follows:
The term “food additive” means any substance the intended use of which
results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in
its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any
food (including any substance intended for use in producing,
manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging,
transporting, or holding food; and including any source of radiation
intended for any such use), if such substance is not generally recognized,
among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
its safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific procedures
(or, in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958,
through either scientific procedures or experience based on common use
in food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use; except that
such term does not include—
(1) a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw agricultural
commodity or processed food; or
(2) a pesticide chemical; or
(3) a color additive; or
(4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or
approval granted prior to September 6, 1958, pursuant to
this chapter, the Poultry Products Inspection Act [21
U.S.C. 451 et seq.] or the Meat Inspection Act of March
4, 1907, as amended and extended [21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.];
(5) a new animal drug; or
(6) an ingredient described in paragraph (ff) in, or intended
for use in, a dietary supplement.
Id.
117.
COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 2017 UPDATE, supra note 116, at 16. Presumably,
the FDA considers changes to a genetic sequence using biotechnology to create a new
substance. This designation is questioned by many steeped in the field because mutagenesis

2018]

GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD

561

While manipulating DNA is not technically a food additive, the FDA seems to make
use of these provisions to address the issue.118 In determining whether a food
additive, as thus defined, can be marketed, the FDA—like the EPA, and in contrast
to the USDA—has chosen to rely on the language of its authorizing statute rather
than issue supplementary regulations.119 This means that it evaluates each
application for approval of a food additive on an individual basis, applying the
statutory provisions to the information that appears in the application.120 As might
be imagined, given the age and generality of the statutory language, the FDA’s
procedure grants it a good deal of discretion, and it creates a good deal of uncertainty
when applied to the enormously varied and rapidly developing field of GM foods.
In 1992, the FDA attempted to ameliorate this situation by issuing a
guidance document that includes a mechanism for a “voluntary consultation
process” prior to a GM product entering the food supply.121 The consultation process
is not actually voluntary because every GM product goes through it.122 It requires
extensive studies demonstrating that the genetically engineered version is as safe
and nutritious as its conventional counterpart. In particular, section VII of the FDA’s
guidance document provides an extensive list of “scientific considerations for
evaluating the safety and nutritional aspects of foods from new plant varieties,”
including the following: questions and endpoints for determining whether the
genetic modification alters known toxicants of the host and donor species; its
potential for transfer of food allergens; a safety evaluation of donor DNA; its
concentration of important nutrients; the safety and nutritional value of newly
introduced proteins; and the identity, composition, and nutritional value of any
modified oils, fats, or carbohydrates.123
As might be imagined, completing this pre-market review is expensive and
time-consuming.124 Most scientists with experience in GM regard it as
by conventional methods also introduces genetic modifications, but the resulting food may
be considered GRAS. In other words, this interpretation may be scientifically indefensible.
118.
21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012).
119.
Id.; Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22,984, 22,990 (May 29, 1992) (“The new methods of genetic modification have focused
attention, however, on the possibility that intended changes in the composition of food
resulting from genetic modification might be of a nature sufficient as a legal and public health
matter to trigger regulation of a component of the food under section 409 of the act.”); see
also LISA HEINZERLING, FOOD LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 296–334 (2017).
120.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938).
121.
FDA 1992 Guidance Document, supra note 1, at 22,985.
122.
Conko et al., supra note 20, at 496 (“The FDA ‘requests’ developers of GE
crops to discuss with the agency whether foods derived from those crops are ‘substantially
equivalent’ to foods from the same unmodified crops. . . . With the knowledge that the FDA
has the authority to remove from commerce any foods it deems unsafe, developers of GE
crops have in every case consulted with the FDA, producing extensive documentation of each
new product’s safety and nutritional equivalency to a non-engineered reference food.”
(internal citation omitted)).
123.
FDA 1992 Guidance Document, supra note 1, at 22,991.
124.
Conko et al., supra note 20, at 496 (“[E]ven for products of negligible risk,
some of these reviews have been unnecessarily prolonged: for example, 34 months in the case
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unnecessary.125 It is important to remember that non-GM manufacturers may be
using large-scale mutagenic techniques, such as irradiation or chemical
mutagenesis, to obtain a particular trait, which means that the resulting crop almost
certainly has many unknown and uncharacterized mutations.126 The FDA could,
under its authority, require these manufacturers to undergo the same extensive premarket testing, but in practice, it does not. The elaborate procedure established by
the FDA guidance, voluntary in name but virtually compelled in fact, applies only
to GM products.
In 2006, the FDA released a lengthy guidance document expressing its
current thinking on the procedures that developers of GM food should contemplate
following.127 This addressed the possibility that new varieties of bioengineered
plants may be inadvertently introduced into the environment and thus the food
supply, a circumstance known as adventitious presence (AP).128 As noted above,
APHIS regulates anything deemed to be a plant pest; but some forms of
bioengineered crops will not be engineered to be plant pests; thus, the FDA issued a
guidance document to scoop up those crops that do not need to undergo review by
APHIS. The concern, expressed by the FDA, is that uncharacterized traits may be
introduced into the environment, incorporated by non-GM crops, and then
inadvertently introduced into the food supply.129 Notably, this early evaluation is in
addition to the FDA’s recommendation that developers participate in the FDA’s
1992 biotechnology consultation process.130 In practice, it takes about ten years and
$136 million to move a GM product through the FDA’s regulatory process.131 This
is in stark contrast to foods created through conventional breeding techniques, which
usually enter the marketplace as GRAS and, thus, without significant FDA review.

of non-browning Artic apples. . . .”); see also J.R. Prado et al., Genetically Engineered Crops:
From Idea to Product, 65 ANN. REV. PLANT BIOLOGY 769, 770 (2014) (costing an average of
$136 million and ten years for an entire regulatory review, not just by the FDA).
125.
Conko et al., supra note 20, at 493–97; Steven H. Strauss & Joanna K. Sax,
Ending Event-Based Regulation of GMO Crops, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 474, 475–76.
126.
Noteworthy is that the FDA has never considered these large-scale mutagenic
techniques to be “additives.”
127.
Guidance for Industry: Recommendations for the Early Food Safety
Evaluation of New Non-Pesticidal Proteins Produced by New Plant Varieties Intended for
Food
Use,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/
Biotechnology/ucm096156.htm (last updated July 1, 2016) [hereinafter FDA 2006 Guidance
Document].
128.
Id.; see also Strauss & Sax, supra note 125, at 476 (discussing AP).
129.
FDA 2006 Guidance Document, supra note 127; see also Strauss & Sax, supra
note 125, at 476 (discussing the FDA’s 2006 guidance document).
130.
FDA 2006 Guidance Document, supra note 127. (“Yes, we recommend that if
you decide to commercialize your new plant variety that you participate in FDA’s
biotechnology consultation process even if you have submitted to us and completed the early
food safety evaluation of the new protein in your bioengineered plant.”).
131.
Prado et al., supra note 124, at 769–90.

2018]

GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD

563

The FDA has also issued guidance on its use of guidance.132 This unique
document, a “meta-guidance” as Professor Richard Epstein calls it,133 offers a
definition of guidance, explains how the agency will use it, and outlines procedures
for public participation. The definition is that guidance documents “describe the
agency’s interpretation of or policy on a regulatory issue.”134 The document goes on
to declare that “[g]uidance documents do not establish legally enforceable rights or
responsibilities. They do not legally bind the public or FDA.”135 The document
distinguishes between “level 1” guidance, which includes “initial interpretations of
statutory or regulatory requirements . . . complex scientific issues . . . [and] highly
controversial issues,”136 and “level 2” guidance, which are, in the FDA’s view,
“minor changes in interpretation or policy.”137 For level 1 guidance, but not for level
2 guidance, the FDA states that it will publish a notice of the proposed guidance in
the Federal Register and the proposed guidance itself on the Internet, invite
comments, review the comments, and then publish a notice of the final guidance in
the Federal Register and the final guidance itself on the Internet.138 It will not do so,
however, if it “determines that prior public participation is not feasible or
appropriate.”139
D. Reevaluation of the Coordinated Framework
In July 2015, after decades of research on GM foods and many calls by
scientists to reevaluate the regulatory process, the White House issued a
memorandum asking for a review of the regulatory regime for GM foods to “ensure
public confidence in the regulatory system and to prevent unnecessary barriers to
future innovation and competitiveness by improving the transparency, coordination,
predictability, and efficiency of the regulation of biotechnology products while
continuing to protect health and the environment.”140 This much-needed call for
review sparked commentary reiterating the vast amount of research over many
decades showing the utility and safety of genetic engineering techniques.141
As part of the process to reevaluate the Coordinated Framework, the White
House released an update to the regulation of biotechnology products on January 4,
2017.142 One main criticism by many engaged in the field was that it was necessary
132.
21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2015). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
relied heavily on this document to produce its own meta-guidance, a bulletin on “Good
Guidance Practices.” Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432
(Jan. 25, 2007).
133.
Epstein, supra note 5, at 70; see also Rakoff, supra note 5, at 160 (discussing
the FDA guidance in the context of the general interplay between legislative rules and
guidance).
134.
21 C.F.R. § 10.115(b)(1).
135.
§ 10.115(d)(1).
136.
§ 10.115(c)(1).
137.
§ 10.115(c)(2).
138.
§ 10.115(g)(1)(ii).
139.
§ 10.115(g)(2).
140.
Holdron et al., supra note 3, at 1.
141.
See, e.g., Strauss & Sax, supra note 125; Conko et al., supra note 20.
142.
COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 2017 UPDATE, supra note 116.
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to clarify the role that each agency plays in the regulation of new products, especially
when a product may fall within the jurisdiction of multiple agencies.143 The 2017
update memorandum attempted to do so,144 but this is bureaucratic housekeeping; it
does not address the substance of the issue, i.e., which products should or should not
be regulated, and to what extent. To accomplish the update to the Coordinated
Framework, a series of documents containing case studies of different types of
products and the regulatory pathway to commercialization were prepared for public
comment.145 The OSTP, EPA, FDA, and USDA held a series of public meetings to
discuss the case studies, and the verbal comments became part of the official
transcript.146 In addition, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
issued a request for information in the Federal Register to solicit information and
comments that could be used to update the Coordinated Framework.147 The FDA
also noticed a public meeting in the Federal Register.148 In short, the situation today
is somewhat fluid. Clearly, the status of the FDA guidance is under review, and there
has been some effort to obtain public participation in this process. But the FDA
guidance, rather than a rule subject to notice and comment procedure, remains the
basic means by which GM food is regulated at the present time.

III. GUIDANCE AS A MEANS OF REGULATION
Under the Coordinated Framework, the EPA is responsible for the effect of
GM food on the general environment, and the USDA is responsible for the process
by which GM food is produced.149 But the FDA plays a crucial role, and the one that
has been the major source of controversy; it determines whether GM foods can be
marketed to American consumers. The guidance document by which it has chosen
to carry out this role is, in effect, the driving force behind the entire regulatory
system described in the previous Part. If GM foods could not be marketed to
143.
Id. at 2; see Michael P. Vandenberg, The Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh:
Federal Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA. L. REV. 1529, 1550–64 (1986).
144.
COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 2017 UPDATE, supra note 116, at 8.
145.
Id. at 39.
146.
Id. at 52.
147.
Id.
148.
Clarifying Current Roles and Responsibilities Described in the Coordinated
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology and Developing a Long-Term Strategy for
the Regulation of the Products of Biotechnology, Public Meeting, 80 Fed. Reg. 62538-01,
62538. (Oct. 16, 2015). In addition, the Advisory Committee on Biotechnology & 21st
Century Agriculture (AC21) is a working group that is currently gathering information in
response to the growing complexity of agriculture. Advisory Committee on Biotechnology &
21st
Century
Agriculture
(AC21),
U.S.
DEP’T
AGRIC.,
https://www.usda.gov/topics/biotechnology/advisory-committee-biotechnology-21stcentury-agriculture-ac21 (last visited July 28, 2018); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY & 21ST CENTURY AGRICULTURE (AC21), A FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL
COEXISTENCE
DISCUSSIONS
4
(2016),
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ac21-report-final-local-coexistence.pdf.
149.
See id. at 15–17; Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory
Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products Into the Environment, 57 Fed.
Reg. 6753-01, 6754 (Feb. 27, 1992); see also Conko et al., supra note 20, at 495–97
(discussing the Coordinated Framework).
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consumers, farmers would not produce them, and they would have no effect on the
environment.
As will be described below, American administrative law defines two
standard categories of agency action: rules and orders. Rules are, in effect,
supplemental legislation enacted by agencies. Adjudications are individualized
decisions that determine the rights or obligations of a private party, and thus
resemble civil trials. The FDA could have used either of these defined techniques;
that is, it could have issued a rule that determined the circumstances under which
GM foods could be marketed, or it could have adjudicated the marketability of each
proposed GM product on an individualized basis. Instead, it used a different
approach—one that occupies an intermediate position between these two techniques
and that is not defined by law. This Part addresses the legal validity of this approach.
Its conclusions will then be applied, in the following Part, to the FDA’s
responsibility within the Coordinated Framework.
A. Guidance in Administrative Law
Administrative law is a field beset by fiendishly complicated terminology,
and “administrative guidance” is one of the prime examples. As used in current law,
it is not an English word, but rather a translation of the Japanese term Gyōsei
shidō.150 Originally, it was an informal strategy by which Japanese agencies
requested voluntary compliance from regulated parties,151 but Japan’s
Administrative Procedure Act of 1993 subjected it to legal standards.152 The Act
defines “Administrative Guidance” as “guidance, recommendations, advice, or
other acts by which an Administrative Organ may seek, within the scope of its duties
or affairs under its jurisdiction, certain action or inaction on the part of specified
persons in order to realize administrative aims, where such acts are not

150.
Paul A. Davis, Administrative Guidance, SOPHIA U. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INST.
BULL. No. 41, 21 (1972); Jeffrey M. Lepon, Administrative Guidance in Japan, 2 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 139, 139–40 (1978). Its non-English origin is indicated by its use as a concrete
noun that can take an indefinite article (“the FDA issued a guidance”). In English, “guidance”
is an abstract noun that is not introduced by an article (“we need guidance on this issue”), or
only by the definite article when a specific instance is involved (“the guidance provided by
the Bible”). It is thus similar to words such as wisdom or shyness; we speak of the need for
wisdom, or the affliction of shyness, and we can refer to the wisdom of Solomon or the
shyness of a child, but there is no such thing as “a wisdom” or “a shyness.” Similarly, abstract
nouns such as guidance, wisdom, and shyness cannot be pluralized in English; we say “the
guidance many experts offer” or “the wisdom of the ages.” The word “guidances,” which
makes sense when referring to more than one agency pronouncement, is not acceptable
English usage, and the Word program underlines it in red.
151.
Yoriaki Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 L. JAPAN 45, 45–46 (James L.
Anderson trans., 1968); Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance:
Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
923, 926–41 (1984).
152.
[Administrative Procedure Act], Act No. 88 of 1993 (Japan),
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APA.pdf.
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Dispositions.”153 While this language is not a model of clarity, two elements seem
clear enough. First, Japanese guidance is designed to induce specific actions by
regulated parties, and second, it is supposed to do so without the use of the
government’s coercive force.154
In our system, the specific technique to which the term “guidance” has
generally been attached is a type of rule under the APA.155 Section 553 of the APA
prescribes procedures for two types of rulemaking: formal rulemaking, which must
follow the same trial-type procedures as adjudications under sections 556 and 557
of the statute, and informal rulemaking, which must follow only the much less
demanding notice and comment procedure specified in section 553 itself. These are
often described as “legislative rules” because they are equivalent to statutes; to
violate their commands is to violate federal law.156 Section 553 also provides for
several different exceptions from both its formal and informal requirements. In
particular, “interpretative [sic] rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization” are excluded from the section’s notice and comment requirements.157
To the extent that such actions can be considered rules they are, in effect “informal
informal rules;” that is, rules that are subject to fewer “formal” or procedural
requirements than the “informal rules” to which notice and comment requirements
apply. Administrative agencies rely on these exceptions when issuing the kinds of
statements that have come to be characterized by the translated term “guidance.”158
As the courts have increased the scrutiny devoted to informal or notice and comment
rulemaking, originally through the “hard look” doctrine and now through the
framework of a leading case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State

153.
Id. at Ch. 1, Art. 2(vi). “Dispositions” are defined as “the exercise of public
authority by administrative agencies.” Id. at Ch. 1, Art. 2(ii).
154.
Chapter 4 of the Act goes on to describe various features that guidance must
possess. An agency issuing a guidance must remain strictly within its own jurisdictional
limits; it must “make clear to the subject party the purpose and the content of, and the persons
responsible for” the guidance; it must issue the guidance in written form or reduce it to written
form on request; and, in essence, it may not use threats of action or inaction to compel a
regulated party to comply with the guidance. Id. at Ch. 4. These elements of the definition
codify basic features of Japanese guidance as they developed prior to the Act. See Young,
supra note 151, at 932–43.
155.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551–596 (2012).
156.
§ 551(4). See., e.g., Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative”
Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 2 (1994); Jacob E. Gersen,
Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1709 (2007); Richard J. Pierce,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L.J. 547, 552 (2000).
157.
§ 553(b)(3)(A).
158.
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. § 191 (2007). The Bush II Administration
order that subjected guidance documents to the requirements of Executive Order No. 12,866
(cost-benefit review of executive-agency rules), defines the term “guidance document” as “an
agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory action, that
sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a
statutory or regulatory issue.” Id. at 192. In other words, the term “guidance,” as used by
federal agencies, refers to any statement that can be characterized as a rule that falls within
the APA exceptions to the notice and comment requirement.
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Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company,159 agencies have increasingly relied on
these exceptions, as well as others, to effectuate regulation.160 Because none of the
exceptions are defined in the APA, debate about their meaning and their proper
scope has become intense.161
Administrative-law scholars have tended to identify an agency’s use of
techniques described by the translated term “guidance” as falling within the
exception of “interpretative rules.”162 The reason, presumably, is that this verbal
barbarism, which has generally been assumed to mean “interpretive” rather than
being a coinage of some sort, refers to rule-like actions that are not subject to notice
and comment requirements. Thus, it resembles the Japanese practice now defined
by Japanese law. Attaching a new term, with a certain amount of comparative-law
cachet, to the category of interpretive rules may have encouraged their use, or
perhaps it merely intensified the debate about their proper range.
B. The Guidance Conundrum
The statutory home that has been found for the translated term “guidance”
has not turned out to be a happy one. Courts and scholars have experienced great
difficulty in determining the contours of the interpretive-rules exception to section
553 informal rulemaking. Redefining this exception as “guidance,” or as including
guidance, has only made the problem worse. This Section will consider three efforts
to resolve this conundrum, relying in turn on the idea of interpretation, the idea of
legal bindingness, and ex post judicial review. It concludes that the distinction
between interpretive and informal or legislative rules is not simply difficult, but
impossible. This means that fitting guidance within the interpretive-rules exception
159.
463 U.S. 29 (1983); see William Funk, Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410–14 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 84 (1995).
160.
One of the other exceptions is the “good cause” exception. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(B) (2012). See also infra notes 233–86 and accompanying text.
161.
This does not necessarily mean that the agencies are circumventing the APA;
that is, substituting guidance when the law requires them to use notice and comment
rulemaking. It might only mean that they are opting to replace definitive requirements with
recommendations, in the expectation that those will be sufficient to obtain an acceptable level
of compliance. See Connor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 820–23 (2010) (concluding, on the basis of a survey and
analysis of guidance documents, that agencies do not rely on guidance to circumvent their
notice and comment obligations).
162.
See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals and the Like: Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?,
41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1321–27 (1992); Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States:
Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 639–40 (2002); Kristen E. Hickman,
Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 491 (2013); Sam Kalen, The
Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and
Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 657, 658 (2008); Rakoff, supra note
5. Guidance documents can also be characterized as “general statements of policy,” one of
the other operative terms in the § 553(b)(3)(A) exception. See infra notes 163–172 and
accompanying text.
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will be to no avail, and that another way of reconciling the practice (always extensive
and now explicit as well) with the requirements of the controlling statute must be
found.
1. The Problem with Relying on Interpretation
Relying on the idea of interpretation would seem to be a promising way to
delineate the boundaries of the interpretive-rules exception, and thus the boundaries
of guidance. The problem is that the term “interpretive,” or “interpretative,” does
not correspond to the distinction to which it refers; that is, the distinction between
actions that should be subject to notice and comment rulemaking and actions for
which this informal, but nonetheless demanding, procedure is unnecessary. In some
sense, every rule, including every legislative rule, is an interpretation of the statute,
no matter how many policy decisions it embodies. Any agency rule that cannot be
derived from a reasonable interpretation of the statute’s authorization should be
struck down by the judiciary as ultra vires, no matter what procedure was used to
adopt it.163 Moreover, as Jerry Mashaw, Kevin Stack, Peter Strauss, and others have
pointed out, the agency’s task always begins by reading, and thus interpreting, the
statute.164 Barring the rare event of a constitutional challenge to the statute on its
face, the agency is generally the first non-congressional interpreter of the statute and
will often be the only one. The APA seems to acknowledge this reality. It defines
the term “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or
policy . . . . ”165
Unless we want to assert that “interpretate” is different from “interpret”
(but what would it mean?), we are left with the problem that the statute uses the
same term to define a rule and specify the exceptions from that definition.166
Perhaps, however, the ambiguity arises from an overly broad concept of
interpretation. One might be inclined to regard the term that appears in the exception
as referring to the process of explaining the verbal meaning of a specific word or
phrase in the authorizing statute, while treating the word that appears in the initial
definition as referring to the process of using an understanding of the statute as the

163.
That is, in fact, part of the standard of review specified in the APA. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(C) (2012). Every regulation issued by a federal agency begins with a recitation of
the statutory authority for the action being taken.
164.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502–03
(2005); Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret
Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 895 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the
Primary Official With Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of
Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 351 (1990).
165.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012) (emphasis added).
166.
This is similar to the APA’s better-known drafting enigma involving the word
“discretion.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (2012). Section 701(a)(2)
excludes actions “committed to agency discretion by law,” but § 706(2)(A) instructs courts
to hold unlawful agency actions that constitute “an abuse of discretion.” How can courts strike
down actions abusing discretion when discretionary actions are excluded from review?
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basis for action.167 But limiting the meaning of the word “interpret” as used in the
exception to an explication of the statute’s verbal meaning is much too restrictive.
It would subject many agency pronouncements to the notice and comment
requirement that virtually everyone agrees should be excluded.168
As soon as one broadens the term “interpret” in the exception to include
the process that agencies actually employ in creating interpretive rules or guidance,
the term loses its ability to distinguish between those actions and legislative rules.
To use a variant of the fact situation in Hoctor v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, a
leading guidance case decided by Judge Richard Posner,169 suppose a statute
provided that any person keeping “big cats” on private property must file a report
that included specified information.170 Consider two actions: first, the agency issues
a statement that it will consider the term “big cats” to include cheetahs but not
ocelots; second, the agency produces a brochure that lists the locations or websites
where the report can be filed, offers a sample form that the big-cat owners can use,
provides a bibliography of sources about animal behavior and husbandry that the
owners might find relevant in obtaining the information required for the report, and
then summarizes a number of federal-court cases that determined the adequacy of
required disclosures under other statutes.
The agency’s first decision, placing cheetahs within the statute’s
requirements, would appear to be a legislative rule; that is, a definitive imposition
of legal requirements on a group of people who might otherwise be exempt from
167.
This would correspond to the differing approaches to interpretation that have
been explored in literary criticism. Explaining the verbal meaning of a specific word or
phrase would be an effort to resolve the inevitable ambiguities of a text. See, e.g., CLEANTH
BROOKS, THE WELL WROUGHT URN 124–50, 151–66, 167–77 (1942) (examining
Wordsworth’s Intimations, Keats’ Ode to a Grecian Urn, and Tennyson’s Tears, Idle Tears);
WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY 1 (1966); NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF
CRITICISM 270–93 (1971). An understanding of the statute as a basis for action might
correspond to the hermeneutic approach that relates the meaning of a particular language to
the entire text in which the passage appears. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD 157–71 (2011); ANTHONY C. THISELTON, HERMENEUTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 13–
16, 24–34 (2009).
168.
See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 850 (2001) (describing the
range of agency actions that should be subject only to the requirement of publication).
169.
82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996). The decision has been ensconced in academic
discourse—possibly Judge Posner’s motivation for writing it the way he did. For example, it
is the centerpiece of Jacob Gersen’s article proposing the shortcut. See Jacob E. Gersen,
Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1705–08 (2007). And it is the
introductory example for Peter Strauss’s comprehensive discussion of rules governed by the
procedural requirement of publication. See Strauss, supra note 168, at 812–17.
170.
The actual situation in Hoctor was that the agency, having promulgated a rule
(whose validity was unquestioned) that animal enclosures must be of the material and strength
appropriate for the animal being enclosed, then issued an interpretation of the rule requiring
that dangerous animals must be enclosed by a perimeter fence at least eight-feet high. 82 F.2d
at 167–68. The Court declared the interpretation invalid, holding that it constituted a change
in legal obligations that would require notice and comment procedure under the APA. Id. at
171.
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such requirements. Yet this decision is necessarily interpretive, in the sense that it
relies on the verbal meaning of a statutory term. The agency is only authorized to
issue it if it is a reasonable reading of the term “big cats.” An agency rule that
extended the statute to bears, on the grounds that they are equally dangerous, would
be struck down as ultra vires based on a reading of the word “cats;” an agency rule
that extended the statute to house cats would be struck down based on a reading of
the word “big.” If the cheetah rule were challenged, the agency would justify it in
primarily interpretive terms. It might point out that cheetahs belong to same genus
(Panthera) that includes lions and tigers, whereas ocelots do not; that people using
ordinary language would describe cheetahs as big because they are nearly the size
of an adult human, whereas ocelots are much smaller; and that zookeepers place
cheetahs in the same size enclosures as leopards, whereas they place ocelots in
smaller ones. These are the types of interpretive tropes that common-law courts used
in answering category-related questions such as “what is chicken” or “what is a
tomato.”171
In contrast, none of the provisions in the hypothesized brochure can
reasonably be regarded as interpretations, nor can they be justified in interpretive
terms. The list of addresses or websites cannot be derived from any language in the
statute; promulgating such a list is certainly authorized by the statute (if only by
implication), but the particular websites in the brochure are entirely arbitrary from a
statutory perspective. The same is true of the sample form: its content may be
statutorily required, but its visual features—the whole point of providing a sample,
after all—are equally arbitrary. The list of references clearly does not emerge from
any language in the statute; the summaries of cases are interpretations, but not of the
statute that is being implemented. Thus, it is the cheetah rule that is interpretive, not
the various parts of the brochure.
This example suggests that excluding an agency action from notice and
comment requirements on grounds that it is interpretive produces exactly the
opposite result from the intuitive or desirable one. The declaration that cheetahs
should be treated as “big cats” is a definitive expansion of the statutory requirements
beyond what may be called, in Chevron terms, the statute’s unambiguous meaning,
which would include lions and tigers but exclude housecats and bears.172 Although
it is properly described as interpretive, it is a legislative rule and might well be seen
as requiring notice and comment procedures. The various elements of the brochure,
in contrast, consist of non-obligatory information whose purpose is to facilitate
compliance with the statute. In ordinary language, we would tend to call them
“advice,” or perhaps “guidance.” They supplement or add to the statute rather than
171.
See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306 (1893) (although the fact that tomatoes
are biologically fruits is relevant, the decisive fact is that they are described as vegetables in
ordinary discourse); Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
118 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (meaning of the term “chicken” in a contract can be determined by
referring to “one of the dictionary meanings, . . . the definition in the Department of
Agriculture Regulations . . . at least some usage in the trade [and] the realities of the market”).
172.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984). The rule that this case announced is that a reviewing court will determine de novo
if the statute has an unambiguous meaning, and if so, it will apply that meaning, but it will
defer to a reasonable-agency interpretation if the statutory language is ambiguous. Id. at 866.
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interpret it, but they do so only in a way that makes compliance easier and is unlikely
to be viewed as an expansion of the statutory obligations. It thus seems difficult, if
not impossible, to distinguish them from the enormous range of other ways in which
agencies communicate with regulated parties. To require notice and comment
procedures for all of these communications would bring the regulatory process to a
halt.
2. The Problem with Relying on Bindingness
Considerations such as these have induced both judges and scholars to seek
a different way to distinguish between guidance and legislative rules. The one that
has become most prevalent is based on the “bindingness” of the agency’s action.173
The cheetah declaration would be deemed a legislative rule according to this
distinction because it imposes a definitive obligation on a group of private persons.
The elements of the brochure would be regarded as nonlegislative, and thus exempt
from notice and comment, because they merely offer suggestions that a regulated
party can ignore without incurring any sanction.
This distinction seems to rest upon and implement important values. At the
doctrinal level, it maintains the integrity of the APA, precluding agencies from using
an exception to circumvent a legal obligation that the statute imposes on them.174 At
the normative level, it maintains the rule of law by ensuring that legal requirements
that are announced in advance, when there is no opportunity for the private party to
contest particularized applications through the adversary process, are subject to
public participation and reviewed by judicial authorities.175 But the bindingness
criterion is problematic because it does not address the central concerns that underlie
the APA’s notice and comment requirement. To return to the hypothetical brochure,
the website list might be seen as nothing more than friendly advice to the regulated
entity; if that entity knew of another way to submit the information, it would
generally be safe in doing so. But would any regulated party feel comfortable using
anything other than the suggested form? It might be confident that it had read the
statute accurately and provided the required information, thus avoiding liability for
noncompliance. But the possibility that it might incur inconvenience and expense if
the agency mistakenly rejected disclosures that looked unfamiliar would probably
be sufficient to make it feel compelled to use the form.176 In legal doctrine or a
173.
The leading articulation of this standard is probably Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For a ringing endorsement of the
decision, see Pierce, supra note 156, at 554. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
174.
See Hamilton & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 127 (sources asserting that
agencies use guidance to avoid the obligations that the APA imposes on them).
175.
See Epstein, supra note 5, at 48 (agency use of guidance often violates the rule
of law); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy
for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 366–68 (2009) (use of guidance
represents a preference for administrative expertise over public participation).
176.
This is, in effect, the objection that critics of the shortcut proposal have raised.
See Epstein, supra note 5, at 75–92; David Franklin, Legislative Rules, Non-Legislative Rules,
and the Perils of the Shortcut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 303–24 (2010); Mark Seidenfeld,
Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV.
331, 357–64 (2011). It is all very well to give private parties a good chance of prevailing
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law-school classroom, there may be a great difference between disobeying and
annoying a government agency, but in the real, regulated world, that difference is
not as evident.177
The “bindingness” standard confronts an additional and deeper difficulty
when the interaction between rules and adjudications—whether subject to the
APA’s formal adjudication procedures or not—is considered. Suppose the
hypothetical brochure not only gave a list of helpful cases decided under other
statutes, but also announced that those cases serve as a framework for the agency’s
own decisions.178 Selfreferential statements often generate conundrums, and they do
so here as well.179 The agency’s statement about its decisions might be the sort of
observation that an external entity would suggest: “We notice that when we
adjudicate the adequacy of disclosures, we tend to follow disclosure decisions made
by other agencies.”180 On the other hand, it might be a declaration of the agency’s
own intentions: “We intend to follow decisions made by other agencies.”

against the agency when the agency charges them with violation of a statute or regulation, but
lawsuits are expensive, time consuming, uncertain in their outcome, and sometimes disruptive
of ongoing business operations. Thus, regulated parties may well choose to comply with
agency guidance documents, even if they plausibly believe the document is invalid, rather
than disobeying the guidance, having a sanction imposed by the agency, and then challenging
the agency in court.
177.
This emphasizes the oddity of Judge Edwards’s statement, in Ctr. for Auto
Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2006), that
the “flaw” in the argument that the party challenging the guidance raised is that “the
‘consequences’ to which they allude are practical, not legal.” One would think that the
practical consequences of agency action should have a bearing on the action’s legality, rather
than treating the agency’s action as an exercise in jurisprudence.
178.
See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1974), which is generally considered one of the seminal cases on guidance. Pipeline
companies that expected to curtail delivery of natural gas during periods of shortage were
required to file documents specifying their curtailment plans that would be subject to review
by the Commission. Id. at 35. The Commission promulgated an order, characterized as a
policy statement (and thus not subjected to the notice and comment requirements), stating
that it preferred curtailment to be based on end use, rather than existing contractual
commitments. Id. The Court held that the order was valid under the policy-statement
exception because its purpose was not “to provide an inflexible, binding rule but to give
advance notice of the general policy with respect to curtailment priorities that the
Commissions prefers.” Id. at 40.
179.
The most famous, perhaps, being Russell’s Paradox, a contradiction in set
theory that he described as follows:
normally a class is not a member of itself. Mankind, for example, is not a
man. Form now the assemblage of all classes which are not members of
themselves. This is a class: is it a member of itself or not? If it is, it is one of
those classes that are not members of themselves, i.e., it is not a member of
itself. If it is not, it is not one of those classes that are not members of
themselves, i.e. it is a member of itself.
BERTRAND RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY 136 (1919).
180.
This is not fanciful; it is, in essence, the holding of one of the leading guidance
cases, Ctr. for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 452 F.3d at 808, where the court said (per Judge
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These two declarations clearly carry different implications for those subject
to the agency’s authority. In a regulatory program where sanctions are imposed after
an adjudication of some sort, the first is helpful advice that has no effect on the
decisions that are actually made, while the second is virtually equivalent to a rule
that affects, or perhaps even determines, the outcome of the adjudication. In most
cases, however, it will not be possible for outsiders to determine, from the discourse
of a statement that the agency presents as an interpretive rule or guidance document,
which of these declarations are intended. Perhaps a compliance officer or
administrative lawyer familiar with the agency may be able to make the distinction
based on inside knowledge of the agency’s decision-making process. But it is also
possible that even the agency itself may not be able to make the distinction. At
bottom, the question is whether the decision-maker is open minded about changing
its previous pattern of decisions on the basis of new arguments or information, and
this is an extremely difficult matter for anyone, including the decision-maker, to
know.
Several administrative-law scholars, including Richard Epstein and Mark
Seidenfeld, suggest that this problem could be solved by subjecting guidance
documents to immediate judicial review to determine their validity.181 In other
words, courts should abandon the existing requirements of standing and finality
when asked to adjudicate the validity of a rule that the agency claims comes under
one of the exceptions specified in section 553, such as the one for interpretive
rules.182 These scholars argue, quite correctly, that a regulated party may feel
compelled to comply with an agency command if it cannot obtain a determination
of the command’s validity before designing its compliance strategy.183 But the
ambiguity of the translated term “guidance” would open the agency to challenges
against a much wider range of its communications than would seem desirable. More
Edwards) that the agency’s guidance stating that it may allow vehicle manufacturers to limit
their recall of defective vehicles to those states where weather conditions make the defect less
likely to cause injury was “nothing more than a privileged viewpoint in the legal debate”
about geographically limited recalls.
181.
Epstein, supra note 5, at 63; Seidenfeld, supra note 176, at 386.
182.
In general, federal courts impose a variety of rules limiting access to judicial
review of administrative actions. These include standing limitations based on the identity of
the plaintiff or the nature of the claim, and timing limitations based on failure to exhaust
administrative remedies or the fact that the agency has not taken final action on the claim. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583–84 (1992) (suit could not go forward
because plaintiff lacked a sufficient personal stake in the outcome, and relief sought was
purely procedural); Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976) (lack
of causal connection between injury claimed and relief sought); McGee v. United States, 402
U.S. 479, 490 (1971) (applicant for conscientious-objector status must present his claim to
draft board before being granted a judicial hearing); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232,
245 (1980) (plaintiff cannot obtain judicial relief when claim is part of a larger proceeding
that remains under agency consideration).
183.
See Epstein, supra note 5, at 75–92; Franklin, supra note 176, at 303–24;
Seidenfeld, supra note 176, at 357–64. Similar considerations led the Supreme Court to grant
review in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the leading case on the availability
of pre-enforcement judicial review of agency regulations.
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generally, this ambiguity creates the danger that any effort to restrain or regulate
agency guidance, in the translated or technical sense, could spill over into the
broader category of actions to which the ordinary language terms apply.184 This
would enable private parties to impede and frustrate regulatory law in its entirety,
much as they were able to do in the few cases where formal rulemaking was
required.
Underlying these pragmatic difficulties with an expansion of judicial
review lies a deeper and still more intractable problem. Our legal tradition provides
us with no theory or experience for imposing substantive rules on executive
authority.185 The development of democratic government in Britain was achieved by
progressively limiting the power of the monarch, transferring his authority to
Parliament and, to a lesser but significant extent, independent courts.186 Thus, we
know how to limit executive authority, but our political tradition does not provide
us with established methods to constrain its exercise or evaluate its performance.
Therefore, when the APA was drafted, it is not surprising that Congress was able to
articulate procedural requirements that would constrain the legislative and
adjudicatory functions of an agency,187 but not its executive function. The legislative
function was subjected to section 553’s notice and comment process, while the
adjudicatory function was subjected to the more elaborate, court-like requirements
of sections 556 and 557. The executive function went unregulated and virtually
unnoticed.188 That is the scholars’ residual category of informal adjudication, a term
the APA does not use for an issue that the APA does not address.189

184.
See Steven M. Johnson, In Defense of the Short Cut, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 495,
532 (2012); Rakoff, supra note 5, at 168; Strauss, supra note 168, at 838–43.
185.
Substantive limits on governmental power in general are, of course, available
from the political-rights tradition. See, e.g., GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE ROAD TO
MODERNITY: THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS (2005); LYNN HUNT,
INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS (2007). These have been applied to the executive through the
mechanism of judicial review. But substantive limits that are specifically directed to the
executive are absent. It is notable, for example, that none are stated in the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights, as opposed to the explicit limits on the legislature and the implicit but widely
understood limits on judicial authority. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 (prohibiting bills of
attainder, direct taxes, taxes on state exports, expenditures without state authorization, and
title of nobility); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (prohibiting punishment of persons for treason by a
family member); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting federal judicial power to specified cases); id.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (limiting Supreme Court authority to appellate jurisdiction except in specified
cases).
186.
For more extensive discussion of this point, see Edward L. Rubin, Executive
Action: Its History, Its Dilemmas and Its Potential Remedies, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2016).
187.
See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1263–68 (1986) (describing compromise between New Dealers and their
opponents regarding the level of procedural requirements imposed on rulemaking and
adjudication); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present and Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 452–62
(1986).
188.
See Rubin, supra note 186, at 9–15.
189.
See The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform, 56
YALE L.J. 670, 703–04 (1947) (observing that the APA’s two dichotomies of rulemaking vs.
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The upshot is that it is impossible to distinguish legislative from
nonlegislative action for the purpose of defining or constraining guidance. There is
no set of principles or standards for executive action on which the distinction can be
based. Any substantive principle that is proposed will necessarily rest on shifting
sand and will be undermined by the fluidity and subterranean dynamics of a system
we do not know how to control or even describe. Interpretation will merge into
command; communications will exhibit kaleidoscopic shifts from friendly advice to
veiled threats to adversarial demands; crucial decisions will disappear from stated
rules to appear in directives to adjudicators, or never appear in either and hide out
in employee manuals or training documents. It is always possible to formulate some
verbal test to characterize the concept of guidance, but it will never be possible to
apply that test in any realistic way.
3. The Problem with Relying on Ex Post Review
Several scholars have suggested a different way of resolving the difficulty
of determining whether a guidance document is acceptable as an interpretive rule or
illegal because it is, in fact, a legislative rule. Sometimes labeled the “short cut,” it
is described by Jacob Gersen as follows:
Rather than asking whether a rule is legislative to answer whether
notice and comment procedures should have been used, courts should
simply ask whether notice and comment procedures were used. If
they were, the rule should be deemed legislative and binding if
otherwise lawful. If they were not, the rule is nonlegislative. If the
rule is nonlegislative, a party may challenge the validity of the rule in
any subsequent enforcement proceeding; if the rule is legislative, the
agency may rely on the rule in a subsequent enforcement proceeding
without defending it.190

If guidance is associated with interpretive rules, this proposal then becomes
a way to resolve questions about the propriety of this device.191 An agency could
issue whatever guidance documents it chose, but because they were not subjected to
adjudication and formal vs. informal produced a category of action that the statute neither
described nor controlled). This category includes a vast range of administrative action,
including planning, negotiation, threats, inspections, no-action letters, etc. See PETER L.
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 210 (2d ed. 2002); Marshall J.
Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV. 337, 355–56
(1986); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107–08, 173–81 (2003).
190.
Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719
(2007); see John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 932 (2004)
(advancing a similar approach to “nonlegislative” rules); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri
Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1460–65 (2011) (shortcut solution to problem of non-legislative rules may be undermined by doctrine that courts
defer to agency interpretations of their own regulations); E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing
Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490–91 (1992) (courts should respect agency’s declaration
about whether a rule is binding, and only reverse the agency if it then treats the rule as binding
in a particular case).
191.
Seidenfeld, supra note 176, at 352–56.
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informal rulemaking procedures (this being, in effect, the definition of guidance),
the agency could not rely on the provisions of the document in an enforcement
proceeding but rather would be required to defend them as proper interpretations of
enacted statutory or regulatory rules.
The short cut appears to be an elegant solution, but a number of
administrative-law scholars, including Mark Seidenfeld, Richard Epstein, and David
Franklin, have voiced objections to it.192 They point out that giving the agency free
reign to adopt rules without subjecting it to notice and comment procedures, and
only declaring those rules invalid in subsequent enforcement actions, grants the
agency too much discretion. As noted above, many regulated parties may not want
to disobey their regulatory agency and then challenge the agency’s enforcement
action in court. It may be less costly for the party to comply, and certainly less likely
to inflict reputational damage.193 In addition, many agencies have the authority or
pragmatic ability to impose significant sanctions on a party that violates a rule that
the agency regards as valid.194 Those sanctions would be maintained until the matter
is resolved by litigation, a process that can take many years.195
A further criticism of the shortcut proposal is that it is too lenient because
agencies receive extensive deference under the Chevron doctrine.196 That doctrine,
which applies specifically to agency interpretation of its authorizing law, provides
that any ambiguity in the statutory language should be resolved in favor of the

192.
Epstein, supra note 5, at 62–68; Franklin, supra note 176, at 303–24 (2010);
Seidenfeld, supra note 176, at 357–64; see also Anthony, supra note 162, at 1318 (raising
similar concerns about guidance documents in a more general context).
193.
See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
194.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2012) (Federal Trade Commission may issue a
cease-and-desist order, enforced by its authority to initiate a civil action where relief may
include “rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property, the
payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair or
deceptive act or practice”); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2012) (Securities Exchange Commission
may, after an administrative hearing, impose penalties of up to $37,500 per day for violation
of statutory rules or agency regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (2012) (EPA may, if it finds
that a state has failed to enforce a Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan, impose an
administrative penalty of up to $25,000 per day, in addition to bringing a civil action).
195.
In response to this concern, Professor Stephen Johnson suggests that the
shortcut proposal can be modified by requiring the agency to publish (on the Internet)
significant rules that it regards as guidance, receive comments on those rules, and then subject
that decision to judicial review. Stephen M. Johnson, In Defense of the Short Cut, 60 U. KAN.
L. REV. 495, 498 (2012). There is certainly no harm in requiring electronic publication, and
it would be hard to stop people from commenting if they chose to do so, but opening the
process to judicial review would once again “formalize” and encumber agency
communication, particularly if comments were, in fact, received. The suggestion here is that
the court should evaluate a challenge to a guidance document on the basis of whether
comments would be likely; if so, then full notice and comment process should be required.
196.
Epstein, supra note 5, at 60–61; Franklin, supra note 176, at 321–23;
Seidenfeld, supra note 176, at 354–57; see Hickman, supra note 162, at 484–91, 510–15
(2013) (analyzing the various contentions in the debate regarding the shortcut proposal).
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agency’s interpretation.197 Defenders of the shortcut proposal have responded that
the force of this objection has been much reduced by the Court’s subsequent decision
in United States v. Mead Corp.198 In Mead, the Court denied Chevron deference to
agency action that does not represent a law-making effort by the agency itself.199
Guidance, the defenders suggest, would generally fail to meet this test and thus be
denied the deference that Chevron grants to more definitive action, such as informal
rulemaking and formal adjudication.200 It would, therefore, be subject to more
intensive scrutiny, possibly by being reviewed de novo, but more likely by being
granted the lesser level of deference that the Mead decision applied.201 In other
words, the defenders of the shortcut are suggesting that the crucial distinction
between agency action that should be regarded as a legislative rule and action that
should be regarded as merely interpretive is the level at which the agency action is
taken, or perhaps the agency’s own commitment to the policy that the action
implements.
Once again, however, the distinction in question does not correspond to the
one we want to make; that is, the one that seems both intuitive and desirable.202 It is
true that informal rules and formal adjudications constitute definitive and fully
authorized action by the agency and are, according to the rationale of the Chevron
decision, entitled to deference. It is also true that certain actions that we identify as
guidance, such as advice to a regulated party from a subordinate official, might not
necessarily reflect the agency’s position, so courts might want to scrutinize them
more carefully on that basis. But a guidance document might be adopted at the
highest levels of the agency; that is, by its presidentially appointed decision-makers,
whether a single director or a multi-member board. Returning to the big-cat scenario,
for example, if this regulation was regarded as central to the agency’s mission, it
seems plausible that the hypothesized brochure would be submitted to the secretary
or the board for approval. This is certainly true of the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) “Policy Statement” regarding the broadcasting of “indecent”

197.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue. . . [a
reviewing court should not] simply impose its own construction of the statute. . . the question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
198.
533 U.S. 218 (2001). Mead holds that product-specific decisions about tariff
status by low-level agency officials are not entitled to Chevron deference, but only to the
lower level of deference provided in the earlier case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944). Id. at 235.
199.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231–34.
200.
Gersen, supra note 190, at 1720–21; Manning, supra note 190, at 937–40.
201.
See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234–39 (holding that the agency’s decision is
entitled to the lower level of deference established in Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
202.
For other responses to the preservation of the shortcut solution through Mead,
see Franklin, supra note 176, at 276; Manning, supra note 190, at 940–44; Seidenfeld, supra
note 176, at 354–57.
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language,203 subsequently at issue in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.204 In fact,
the document begins: “The Commission issues this Policy Statement to provide
guidance to the broadcast industry . . . .” It is equally true of the FDA guidance
document that this Article discusses.205
There are, moreover, a variety of documents or pronouncements that are
even less formal than an interpretive rule or guidance document but nonetheless
represent a decision of the agency at its highest level. Perhaps the clearest example
is the employee manual. This might well be the document that the staff members
who carry out the agency’s functions regularly consult to determine their proper
courses of action, and the staff members’ supervisor might treat their failure to obey
the manual’s rules as grounds for discipline or dismissal.206 Significant changes in
the employee manual are likely to be matters that are considered by the secretary or
the board. Nor is this internal document the most “informal” means that an agency’s
directors can use to control the behavior of their subordinates. Training sessions can
serve the same function as a manual, in some cases more effectively, because they
induce the staff members to internalize the desired behaviors.207 Thus, the protocols
or curriculum of the training sessions, again something that might be designed or
203.
In the Matter of Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law
Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16
FCC Rcd. 7999 (March 14, 2001).
204.
556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (holding that the FCC could validly alter the policy
described in the guidance by subsequent adjudicatory decisions without offering an
explanation beyond that which would be required to justify the decisions in the absence of
the guidance document).
205.
FDA 1992 Guidance Document, supra note 1, at 22,984 (“The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is issuing a policy statement on foods derived from new plant varieties,
including plants developed by recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) techniques. This
policy statement is a clarification of FDA's interpretation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.”)
206.
Employee manuals have been virtually invisible in the decided cases in the
administrative-law area. A rare exception is Morton v. Ruiz, where the Court confronted the
issue because the relevant statute placed no geographic limitation on the availability of the
benefits it provided to Native Americans, but the agency, through a provision in its employee
manual, did not provide benefits to Native Americans living on reservations. 415 U.S. 199,
209 (1974). The Court treated the question as one of statutory interpretation and, after
extensive quotations from congressional hearings regarding both passage of the Act and
subsequent reconsiderations of it, concluded that Congress had not intended the limitation.
Id. at 199. The Court seemed to sense that it would create potential disruption for
administrative agencies to grant no legal force to an employee manual, because that is actually
what determines the behavior of agency staff and, therefore, acknowledged that its provisions
were entitled to some level of deference. Id. at 237 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134). The
Court’s solution was to say, adumbrating Chevron, that such deference would only be granted
if the provision was “consistent with the congressional purpose.” Id. That, of course, leaves
the crucial question—consistent to what extent?—open, and Mead does not resolve that
question in the crucial case of employee manuals. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 220.
207.
See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1299, 1324–36 (1997) (discretion of bank examiners in Germany is tightly controlled by a
three-year training program, not by any printed document that is provided to them).
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approved at the highest level of the agency, might embody the most crucial
decisions. Yet these documents must be regarded as guidance or its equivalent. To
hold that the provisions of an employee manual or the protocols for an employee
training course should be subject to notice and comment rulemaking would not be
viable. It would either lead to massive circumvention of the holding or be equivalent
to the dissolution of the agency.
Conversely, there are some agency decisions made by low-level employees
that we would not regard as guidance, but rather as definitive actions by the agency.
The reason is that some of the decisions reached by administrative judges (AJs),
hearing officers (the former term for AJs), or other agency officials are functionally
equivalent to the decisions reached by administrative-law judges (ALJs). AJs
preside over deportation (removal) hearings that determine the status of the persons
subject to them.208 An automobile-recall hearing that can be presided over by any
designee of the Secretary, such as an automotive engineer, can produce equally
definitive consequences and possess as much precedential value for future decisions
as a hearing by an ALJ.209 If the crucial question is the level at which the decision is
made, however, these decisions would be considered guidance; that is, they would
be reviewed without Chevron deference. But calling a definitive adjudicatory
decision “guidance” seems conceptually wrong, whatever the consequences of the
nomenclature might be. The idea that guidance can be defined in terms of the level
of the agency at which it is adopted seems no better than the idea that guidance can
be defined in terms of its interpretive character or its bindingness for regulated
parties.
C. An Alternative Approach to Governing Guidance
One strategy for solving enigmatic puzzles is to begin with the desired
result and reason backwards.210 This strategy possesses a distinguished equivalent
208.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012) (establishing grounds for deportation of aliens
who, among other things, have violated the immigration laws, engaged in marriage fraud,
committed crimes, or carried out terrorist activity); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (establishing
procedures that shall be presided over by “attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as
administrative judges”). This does not require appointment according to the provisions of 5
U.S.C. § 3105, which defines the status of an administrative-law judge. Shortly after the APA
was enacted, the Supreme Court held that deportation hearings were subject to the formal
adjudication provisions of the Act, which means that an ALJ would need to preside. Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950); see 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3). This decision was
almost immediately overruled by Congress in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951,
64 Stat. 1044, 1048 (1950), and the Court upheld the constitutionality of the congressional
revision in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306–07 (1955).
209.
See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89563, § 111, 80 Stat. 718, 724 (requiring manufacturer of a motor vehicle that violates the
safety standards of the statute in its implementing regulations to repurchase or repair the
vehicle); § 113(e), 80 Stat. at 726 (providing for hearings to determine whether such violation
has occurred, but not requiring that these hearings be subject to the APA adjudication
procedures).
210.
The classic example is the question of how many one-on-one matches must be
played among 100 players in a tournament before the winner of the tournament is determined.
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in law. According to Kelsen’s General Theory, law should be defined by its result;
thus, anything that is properly described as a law should be in the form that if the
private person engages in activity X, the state will impose consequence Y upon the
actor.211 Many legal theorists regard this as reductionist,212 but in a technical field
such as administrative law, where the norms of civil society are attenuated and the
demands of pragmatism strong, it seems like a promising approach.
When a private party challenges an agency guidance document on the
grounds that it should have been adopted as an informal rule under section 553, the
remedy that it is asking for is that the document be subject to notice and comment
rulemaking.213 That is the only thing the plaintiff could be asking for, and the only
thing that the court can require the agency to provide. Of course, the plaintiff might
be hoping that the agency would decide to withdraw the guidance document rather
than subject it to the section 553 procedures, but that decision is entirely within the
discretion of the agency.214
If notice and comment rulemaking is the only possible result that the
plaintiff can expect, then that result might be used to solve the guidance enigma.
The question that the reviewing court might ask when a document that the agency
promulgates as guidance is challenged for failure to comply with section 553, is
whether notice and comment rulemaking would serve a useful purpose in the
promulgation of the document in question. A finding that it would serve such a
purpose would then lead to the conclusion that the document should have been
adopted as an informal rule. A finding to the contrary would lead to the conclusion
that it was validly promulgated as guidance.

It is possible to obtain the answer by beginning with 50 matches, then 25 and so on, but the
easier approach is to begin with the result that 99 of the players need to be eliminated; that is
the number of necessary matches.
211.
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE (2007).
212.
Most notably H.L.A Hart. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961).
213.
This is not simply a matter of choosing one remedy over another, as in the case
of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946) (codified as reenacted and
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2012)), which was enacted in the same year as the APA.
Congress might have chosen to allow punitive-damage claims under the FTCA, but declined
to do so. The remedy of notice and comment rulemaking, in contrast, is implicit in the
structure of the entire APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
214.
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (reviewing courts may not impose additional procedural
requirements on agencies); Nat. Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
294 (1974) (reviewing court should not interfere with agency’s choice of decision-making
procedures); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policy Making Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1398–1403 (2004) (discussing reasons why agencies are granted this discretion). The
plaintiff could not expect that the court would hold the guidance document unconstitutional,
ultra vires, or arbitrary and capricious, these being the standards for judicial review under the
APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). If the plaintiff thought such challenges possible, it would
be filing a different suit; namely, one to preclude the agency’s action in its entirety.
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While some scholars view notice and comment rulemaking as a great
innovation, others question its effectiveness.215 For present purposes, however, the
statute must be taken as a given, and the statutory purpose of its informal rulemaking
procedures is generally agreed upon. First, there is the instrumental purpose of
supplementing the information that the agency possesses or acquires through its own
expertise with information from private parties that is relevant to the issue that the
proposed rule is addressing. Second, there is the normative purpose of providing
private parties with the sense that they have been able to participate in the
rulemaking process, particularly in light of the fact that it is carried out by nonelected officials.216 Thus, a reviewing court could reasonably hold that a guidance
document should have been promulgated as an informal rule because these statutory
purposes were necessary or important in the formulation of the action that the
document embodies.
But the APA balances this policy with a somewhat countervailing policy
of administrative discretion and flexibility in the rulemaking process.217 This is
based on an underlying belief that agencies possess expertise and that they will be
primarily controlled by the political branches; that is, presidential nomination, and
Senate confirmation of the leadership, presidential supervision of agency action and
legislative oversight of such action.218 Perhaps the drafters felt that the relatively
lenient requirements for informal rulemaking, in contrast to the formal standards for
both rulemaking and adjudication, fully implemented that intended policy. Over
time, however, judicial review of informal rulemaking has proved to be demanding,
and it has often been criticized as running counter to that basic policy decision and

215.
See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 448 (2d ed.
1978). (“[A]dministrative rulemaking is one of the greatest inventions of modern government
. . . .”); James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65
VA. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1979) (rulemaking widely used as basic tool of regulation); Robert
W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1314 (1972)
(notice and comment rulemaking suffers from a range of procedural defects); Alan Morrision,
The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253 (1986)
(rulemaking procedure leads to rational and efficient results); Rubin, supra note 189, at 155
(rulemaking procedure is modeled on adjudication and does not produce rational policy).
216.
See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 441 (describing the value of notice and
comment procedures for beneficiaries of the regulation in question).
217.
It is generally agreed that the APA embodies a decision to place fairly strict
procedural constraints on agency adjudication but to grant agencies broad discretion in the
quasi-legislative task of rulemaking. This reflects a compromise between the Democrats, who
wanted to preserve the authority and discretion of the New Deal agencies, and the
Republicans, who wanted to decrease the regulatory burdens on private enterprises. See
McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L., ECON & ORG.
180, 191 (1999); Shapiro, supra note 187, at 452–55; George B. Shepherd, Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 1557, 1649–53 (1996).
218.
See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 127 (3d ed. 1972);
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 41, 82 (6th ed. 2013).
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“ossifying” the rulemaking process.219 If a court decides that a pronouncement that
the agency describes as guidance—and thus falls within an exception to the
rulemaking requirements—is in fact subject to those requirements, it will be
expanding the scope of this ossification process and further frustrating the intention
of the APA. This suggests that the remedy of notice and comment rulemaking should
be imposed with caution.220
A remedially oriented approach to the review of guidance documents
would satisfy both the instrumental and normative goals of notice and comment
procedure and the countervailing goal of rulemaking flexibility. To begin with, this
approach suggests that notice and comment rulemaking should only be imposed on
agency pronouncements to the general public. Instructions to staff members of the
agency, even if they are instructions regarding the direction that formal or informal
adjudications are expected to take, should be exempt from notice and comment. This
result can probably be reached under a separate statutory exemption in the same
clause as the interpretive exemption; namely, “rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice.” As indicated above, however, staff directives of various
kinds, such as those found in employee manuals or training documents, can exercise
significant impacts on the public. Whether a particular instruction is truly a rule of
agency procedure, rather than a decision rule, may be unclear. The preferable
principle is that subjecting internal rules to notice and comment rulemaking
procedures would impair the flexibility of the regulatory process to an unacceptable
degree.221 There is simply no way to distinguish among non-promulgated directives,

219.
McGarity, supra note 159, at 1387–97; Pierce, supra note 159, at 66; Paul R.
Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification: A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453,
453–57 (1995). The ossification claim, however, has been subject to substantial criticism.
See, e.g., William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 395–96 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of
Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 490–92 (1997). Several empirical
studies conclude that there is little evidence to support the ossification theory. See Cary
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1127–31
(2002); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1436–40 (2012).
220.
See Johnson, supra note 184, at 495–96; Mantel, supra note 175, at 398;
Strauss, supra note 168, at 804–08. Considering the relative values of democratic
accountability and agency expertise, Professor Mantel reaches the conclusion that agency
expertise should be favored, on social-contract grounds, and thus concludes that notice and
comment rulemaking should be restricted and agency guidance should be favored. Mantel
supra note 175, at 398–405. The suggestion here is somewhat similar but does not necessarily
grant guidance a broader scope. Rather, it suggests that guidance should be used when
additional participation, which can be regarded as somewhat similar to democratic
accountability, would serve a purpose and avoided where it would only impose a further
procedural hurdle on the agency.
221.
Whether or not judicial review “ossifies” the process of informal rulemaking,
it seems likely that extending judicial review beyond that process to the many truly informal
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given the lack of substantive standards for executive action. Any suggestion that
such directives could be challenged for their failure to use notice and comment
rulemaking procedures would give regulated parties the power to bring the entire
regulatory process to a halt. In other words, a remedy of that sort would destroy the
underlying action.
Once a document is promulgated, its eligibility for the interpretive-rule
exception should be assessed in terms of both its instrumental and normative value.
The instrumental question is whether ordering the remedy of notice and comment
rulemaking will provide the agency with information that might otherwise be
unavailable to the agency, or be ignored by the agency because of a pre-existing
mindset. We do not want an agency to take action when there is evidence available
that the action is likely to be ineffective or counterproductive, nor do we want an
agency to take action that will have unintended consequences, such as inadvertently
damaging someone’s business with a regulation designed for a different purpose.
Notice and comment rulemaking is a remedy for mistakes such as these,
but that remedy should only be imposed on agency action when it is likely to produce
the desired information. In many cases, an agency issuing a guidance document will
have been in longstanding and continuous contact with the firms that it is regulating,
and it will already possess all the information that it needs or is likely to get.222
Similarly, the agency may have already held hearings or carried out research. With
respect to a rule that might be viewed as either interpretive or legislative, a court
should only require informal rulemaking procedures when it can identify some
potential body of information that the agency has ignored because it did not make
use of those procedures.223 It is not enough to demonstrate that the procedures will
produce additional communications because these communications may be of no
informational value. Prior judicial decisions have identified the types of
communications that an agency can validly ignore, and this experience should be
used in determining whether the remedy of notice and comment rulemaking is likely
to produce anything of greater value.224

decisions that agencies make in the course of administering a regulatory program would be
truly disruptive. See Jordan, supra note 219.
222.
See, e.g., FDA 1992 Guidance Document, supra note 1, at 22,984
(“Representatives of the food biotechnology industry have expressed to FDA the need for
strong by appropriate oversight by Federal agencies to ensure public confidence in foods
produced by the new techniques.”). The heavy regulation at the time may have led to an
unintended consequence, which is that the public perceives that GM food is dangerous
because it is heavily regulated. Wiedemann & Schutz, supra note 11, at 402–05.
223.
Professor Elliott argues that notice and comment rulemaking has ceased to
serve any informative purpose because agencies get the information they need through
“informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups.” Elliott, supra note
190, at 1492. The argument here is that such familiar channels of communication will be
sufficient if it seems unlikely that anyone outside those channels would want to comment or
have anything to add. When that is not the case, however, notice and comment rulemaking
becomes valuable and important.
224.
See, e.g., Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1990) (agency was
not required to give “Rosalie A. Rybachek, North Pole, Alaska, pro se” an additional
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The normative question is whether the proposed rule activates people’s
desire for participation. Many agency pronouncements involve technical matters
with an extremely low political profile.225 They may be controversial within the
affected industry, but they are of limited interest to those outside it. When notice of
such rules is given under section 553, it generates only a small number of comments,
and those comments come from industry insiders who have already been in contact
with the agency about the issue. There seems to be no normative value in expanding
the scope of notice and comment procedure to include more agency actions of this
sort. To conclude that an agency document that is promulgated as guidance should
be subject to notice and comment procedures on participatory grounds, a court
should be convinced that there are people who would want to participate. In fact,
Judge Posner offered this criterion, in dictum, to justify his conclusion in Hoctor.
He wrote: “The Department’s lawyer speculated that if the notice and comment
route had been followed in this case the Department would have received thousands
of comments. The greater the public interest in a rule, the greater reason to allow the
public to participate in its formation.”226
This interpretation of the legislative-rule exception to section 553’s
requirements tracks the prevailing interpretation of the “good cause” exception that
the agencies themselves have developed.227 Several agencies—most notably the
EPA, various units within the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of

opportunity to comment on the record). The scheme of relevance is determined by the
Supreme Court’s formula for arbitrary and capricious review in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); essentially a codification of the
previous “hard look” doctrine. That formula is that the reviewing court should overturn a
regulation “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” or made an error of judgment
in assessing relevant evidence. Id. Thus, a comment related to an issue that was not within
the scope of the congressional legislation, or the problem as identified by the agency and
evaluated by the court, can be safely ignored.
225.
See, e.g., Fuel Economy Regulations for Automobiles: Technical
Amendments and Corrections, 74 Fed. Reg. 61537-01, 61537–555 (Nov. 25, 2009) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. §§ 86, 600) (making minor corrections and amendments to final rule for fueleconomy labeling requirements for cars and light trucks, including a slight revision to the
minivan definition; changing corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for 2008–
2011 model-year passenger automobiles and light trucks to add reporting requirements for
manufacturers to report to the EPA their applicable reformed CAFE fuel-economy standards
and adding provisions to clarify that special test procedures, calculation methods, and label
formats may be used for advanced-technology vehicles for fuel-economy labeling and CAFE
purposes); Launch Safety: Lightning Criteria for Expendable Launch Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg.
33,139, 33,139–152 (June 8, 2011) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 417) (amending lightning commit
criteria to account for new information regarding the risks of natural and triggered lightning).
226.
Hoctor v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996).
227.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1966) (holding that the requirement of notice and
comment does not apply “when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest”).

2018]

GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD

585

Transportation228—in conjunction with recommendations by the Administrative
Conference of the United States,229 have instituted a practice referred to as “direct
final rulemaking”: publishing a rule in the Federal Register that the agency declares
will be final as long as there is no objection to it. This resembles the familiar
management technique of a consent calendar, where items are placed on the meeting
agenda of a board or deliberative chamber and then accepted without discussion
unless one member of the body objects.230 As with that technique, a single objection
is sufficient to stop the direct final rule from going into effect and require the agency
to revert to notice and comment procedure.231
The rationale behind direct final rulemaking is that there is no point
engaging in the time and expense of notice and comment procedure if the proposed
rule is uncontroversial, such as conforming a regulation to a statutory revision or
simplifying a form without changing its content.232 Of course, questions will arise
about whether a particular proposal truly fits within the term “good cause” as used
by the APA, whether a comment to the final rule should count as adverse, whether
the agency needs to publish a confirmation that the rule has not received any adverse
comments before it goes into effect, and what the timing of the initial publication or
the confirmation should be.233 The EPA has chosen to proceed without resolving

228.
See Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4
(1995) (describing the way the three named agencies have employed this device).
229.
Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43108-02, 43111-112 (Aug. 18,
1995).
230.
For an example of this technique used by the Department of Health and Human
Services, see Consent Calendar and Appendices Procedures, 45 C.F.R. § 2102.14 (2018).
231.
See, e.g., How Does the FAA Process Direct Final Rules?, 14 C.F.R. §
11.31(a) (2018)(“A direct final rule will take effect on a specified date unless the [Federal
Aviation Administration] FAA receives an adverse comment or notice of intent to file an
adverse comment within the comment period.”); Direct Final Rule Procedures, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125166.htm
(last updated Mar. 21, 2018) (“FDA ordinarily will allow at least 75 days for comment on the
direct final rule after it is published in the Federal Register. If the agency receives any
significant adverse comment, the agency will publish a notice of significant adverse comment
and withdraw the direct final rule.”); see also Levin, supra note 228, at 1.
232.
See Levin, supra note 228, at 12 (quoting examples of actions for which notice
and comment would fit into the definition of “unnecessary” according to the House and
Senate Reports accompanying the APA).
233.
See Michael Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules: An Empirical Study of Direct
Final Rulemaking, 72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 80 (2009); Levin, supra note 228, at 26–28; Ronald
M. Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51 ADMIN.
L. REV. 757, 760–63 (1999); Lars Noah, Doubts About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN.
L. REV. 401 (1999). Most of these issues are not directly relevant to the analogy between
direct final rulemaking and guidance that is being used here. One overlap involves the
question of what constitutes an adverse comment. Clearly, a response that compliments the
agency should not be regarded as adverse, nor should a comment, whether friendly or hostile,
that is completely irrelevant. But what about an inquiry or a friendly suggestion? See Levin,
supra note 228, at 26–28; Levin, supra note 233, at 759–61; Noah, supra, at 420–22. The
question for the agency is when such comments should lead to withdrawal of the rule; the
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any of these questions on a general level, but the FDA has chosen to promulgate a
general explanation of the way it will use direct final rulemaking.234 Intriguingly, it
has done so in the form of a guidance, thereby raising the issue of self-referential
statements that was discussed above; namely, whether it predicts or announces the
agency’s future position.235
For present purposes, the important point is that the same insight that has
led agencies to base their interpretations of the good-cause exception on the
likelihood of opposition can be used by courts to evaluate an agency’s use of the
interpretative-rules exception. This insight is that the purpose of notice and comment
procedure is to achieve the instrumental and normative values of participation.
Therefore, when participation will not be forthcoming, the cost of this more
elaborate rulemaking procedure need not be incurred. Admittedly, the settings of
these two applications of the insight are somewhat different. When an agency uses
direct final rulemaking, it is predicting that there will be no participation and stands
ready to withdraw the rule and institute notice and comment if its prediction proves
wrong. If a court were to follow the recommendation regarding guidance that this
Article proposes, it would be observing a rule that has been promulgated sometime
in the past and concluding that no significant participation has occurred or is likely
to occur. It would have the advantage of experience, but it would be conclusively
exempting the agency from the need to use notice and comment procedure.
Nonetheless, the two approaches are based on the same idea that the exceptions to
the notice and comment requirements should be understood in terms of the purposes
that those requirements are intended to achieve.
To be sure, a court’s assessment of the likelihood and value of participation
is bound to be somewhat speculative and must rely on judgment. But the existing
standards, such as the interpretive or binding nature of the guidance, share these
same features. The difference is that the remedy-oriented approach provides a
meaningful framework for the exercise of judgment. Any effort to make conceptual
distinctions between guidance and informal rules dissolves into conundrums
because we have no coherent set of legal concepts in the realm that these two modes
of administrative action inhabit. It seems preferable to rely on the one part of the
governing statutory scheme that possesses a definitive contour—the distinction
between actions that are governed by notice and comment rulemaking procedures
and those that can be permissibly taken without resort to those procedures.

question for a court is when such comments indicate that the agency and the public would
benefit from full notice and comment procedure.
234.
Direct Final Rule Procedures, supra note 231. Much of the document
discusses the timing of the rule. On the issue discussed in note 233, the FDA Guidance states,
“significant adverse comment is defined as one where the comment explains why the rule
would be inappropriate, including challenges to the rule’s underlying premise or approach, or
would be ineffective or unacceptable without a change.” Id. The Guidance goes to explain
that “comments that are frivolous, insubstantial, or outside the scope of the rule would not be
considered adverse under this procedure.” Id. This seems to provide the FDA with a fair
amount of leeway in ignoring comments and proceeding with the rule.
235.
See supra note 181and accompanying text.
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IV. EVALUATING THE USE OF GUIDANCE TO REGULATE
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD
As discussed in Part II, administrative guidance has been the principal
mode that federal administrators have employed to regulate GM food. While the
Coordinated Framework was opened to public comment, it was not a regulation—
in the sense of determining any private party’s status—but simply a planning
document. As such, there was no basis for a legal challenge and thus no judicial
review. Of the three agencies that were seen by the Framework as having statutory
authority to regulate GM food, the USDA in fact issued regulations, but only in the
delimited area to which its authority over GM food extended. The EPA exercised its
authority through guidance. Most significantly, the FDA—with the primary
authority in the area of food safety—also acted by guidance and, in fact, has never
issued regulations on the subject.
This Part evaluates the use of guidance, and specifically the guidance
issued by the FDA, to regulate GM food. Its first Section considers the legality of
the decision in light of the discussion in Part III about the proper role of
administrative guidance. It concludes that GM food is an issue that should have been
addressed by regulation, not guidance, and thus through the APA mechanism of
notice and comment rulemaking. The second Section of this Part then considers
whether the use of legislative rules, as opposed to guidance, would have led to better
or worse policy consequences in light of the scientific and public opinion data
presented in Part I. The discussion is necessarily speculative, but our best judgment
is that the use of the notice and comment process would lead to at least two beneficial
results. First, it would serve as a means of educating the general public about the
true risks of GM food;236 second, it would give other industry participants a voice
and possibly lead to more even-handed and effective regulation in this area.
A. The Legality of Guidance on GM Food Regulation
As suggested in the previous Part, neither the interpretation nor the
bindingness tests are meaningful ways to assess the legality of guidance as a
regulatory mechanism, and the ex post review short cut, with its reliance on the level
of agency decision-making, is no better. Applying the general discussion in that Part
to the issue of GM foods, it seems apparent that the FDA approach cannot be
challenged or even evaluated on interpretive or bindingness grounds. The FDA has
authority to require any food that fits into the statutory definition of adulteration or
additives to be subject to its evaluation process.237 That evaluation process
determines the rights of the food’s producer; that is, whether the producer can
market the product in question.238 As such, it is an adjudication within the meaning

236.
One consequence of the current regulatory milieu in this area is that it
contributes to consumer misperceptions of the safety in GM food; that is, the heavy regulation
leads consumers to perceive that this must be an unsafe area. See Wiedemann & Schutz, supra
note 11, at 402–05.
237.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 348 (2012).
238.
See 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(1).
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of the APA. By definition, it is legally binding, and it is only valid if it reaches a
conclusion that represents an acceptable interpretation of the authorizing statute.
The FDA’s guidance document declares that the Agency will evaluate GM
foods according to this process, rather than allow them to be marketed without
testing on grounds that they are GRAS.239 In addition, it outlines the basis on which
it will conduct its evaluation.240 Whether this document is a proper interpretation of
the statute, and whether it is binding on private parties, raises exactly the sort of
quandaries that were discussed above. Much of the FDA’s guidance document
cannot be derived from the statutory language, but it is the sort of information that
is undoubtedly useful to anyone who wants to submit a GM food to the FDA for
evaluation. Requiring notice and comment rulemaking for these sorts of
housekeeping decisions would serve no purpose and would unnecessarily encumber
the regulatory process. The likely result would be that the Agency would
communicate this necessary information to the few large companies with which it
regularly deals in a truly informal manner, such as verbal advice, that would make
the entire process more opaque and run entirely counter to the purposes of the APA.
A bindingness test also suffers from the problems that were outlined above.
When the FDA announces the policies regarding the evaluation of GM foods, is it
actually establishing the policies that will govern its evaluators, or is it simply
informing people of the policies that its evaluators have tended to follow on their
own? How can a court possibly make such a determination? It is conceivable that
there exists some “smoking gun” memo in the Agency’s files that would resolve this
question, but that seems more likely to be found in a Hollywood movie, or on a
conspiracy theory website, than in the real world.
The crucial question—the policy issue that the science of GM food
suggests—is whether these foods should be automatically subjected to the
evaluation process, as opposed to being treated the same way that foods produced
by selective breeding and other GM techniques are treated. That is the most
important consequence of the FDA’s guidance document, but it does not seem to be
an interpretive decision at all. The FDCA of 1938, like most federal regulatory
statutes, authorizes the Agency to take specified actions in a specified range of
situations but does not guide the Agency’s decisions regarding which action will
apply to which situations. Those decisions are generally analogized to prosecutorial
discretion, the highest level of discretion that can be granted to an executive agent,
and thus are decisions in which courts decline to intervene.241 Nor can the FDA’s
239.
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984, 22,985 (1992); see also HEINZERLING, supra note 119, at 304–21.
240.
Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 22,986; see also Conko et al., supra note 20, at 495–98.
241.
See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192–94 (1993) (refusing to review
agency decision to phase out a program providing service to handicapped Native American
children on grounds that allocation of funds lies within the discretion of the agency); Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–34 (1985) (refusing to require the FDA to regulate drugs used
in executions, and noting the “general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to
refuse enforcement”); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532, 1533–35 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
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decision be regarded as binding. It does not bind anyone; it only announces that it
might make binding decisions in certain cases by adjudication.
Academic proposals for alternative approaches to the guidance issue also
seem to be of little assistance in this case. The short cut proposed by Professor
Gersen and others would deprive the FDA of the ability to rely on the guidance
document in a subsequent court challenge.242 But the FDA does not rely on it. If it
forbids a particular food product from being marketed, or allows it to be marketed,
it will necessarily rely on the evaluation itself, not on its decision to evaluate. The
suspension of the administrative-law finality rule suggested by Professors Epstein
and Seidenfeld would not be of much assistance either;243 if the FDA’s guidance
document were challenged in court, the court would still need to decide, according
to current doctrine, on interpretive or bindingness grounds. This would again involve
the difficulties just described with these two standards.
In contrast, the test proposed in the preceding Part—the remedy-oriented
approach—can be used as a supplementary principle, or even the determinative one.
It would address the problem with the FDA’s guidance document directly, asking
whether notice and comment rulemaking should be imposed on the agency; that is,
whether the public participation that this procedure provides is demanded by the
nature of the action that the guidance document embodies. This is not to assert that
such participation will necessarily produce the best result; that issue will be
addressed in the next Section. Rather, the point is that public participation is the
basic procedural requirement that the APA imposes on administrative action.
Determining the proper scope of that participation is therefore the basic task that
courts must undertake in interpreting and applying the prevailing statute.
Both the instrumental and the normative values of notice and comment
rulemaking can be assessed by considering three groups of possible participants:
first, the general public, including public interest organizations; second, large firms
that dominate the market; and third, small firms that are either current or potential
market entrants.244 With respect to the general public, the answer in this case is clear.
The issue of GM foods is of enormous concern. As the Pew Study, summarized in
Part I, indicates, 29% of those surveyed report that they have heard “a lot” about
GM foods, and only 19% report that they have heard “nothing at all.”245 Fully 39%
of those surveyed believe that GM food will cause health problems, and an equal
(refusing to review denial of petition to reopen enforcement investigation); Nat’l Res. Def.
Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (refusing to require
SEC to force regulated firms to disclose environmental and equal employment policies on
ground that agency is in the best position to decide when and how to regulate).
242.
Funk, supra note 159, at 1037; Gersen, supra note 156, at 1719; see Manning,
supra note 190, at 945.
243.
Epstein, supra note 5, at 48; Seidenfeld, supra note 219, at 490.
244.
The assumption of this categorization is that there is no separate group of large
firms that want to enter a market. Although there may be a number of such firms that are
studying the possibility, any large firm that decides to enter a market will do so. This might
not be true for markets with extraordinary barriers to entry, such as automobile
manufacturing, but food production is not a market of that sort.
245.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 44.
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number believe that it will cause problems for the environment.246 A variety of
measures have been proposed or enacted at the state or local level to ban GM food
or to require its disclosure;247 these measures are now preempted by federal law,248
but the fact that GM food producers devoted lobbying resources to passage of this
law indicates that the measures were regarded as a serious threat.249 In other words,
there seems little doubt that regulation of GM food is a highly salient public issue,
about which many Americans have strong opinions. The APA’s notice and comment
requirement is designed to expose agencies to these sorts of concerns. It is thus
preferable to interpret the APA to impose that requirement on the FDA, rather than
allow it to avoid the requirement by issuing a guidance document.250
Large firms that are extensively engaged in crop production include,
according to the Fortune 500 rankings, Archer Daniels Midland (27), Dow Chemical
(48), CHS (62), Dupont (86), and Monsanto (189).251 Companies of this size can be
expected to possess extensive resources for monitoring and lobbying their
regulators. According to the FDA itself, these firms seem comfortable with its
regulations.252 Anecdotal evidence, often from critics of the FDA, confirms this
impression.253 With respect to the issue discussed here, it is these firms that regularly
246.
Id. at 55; see also Sax & Doran, supra note 55, at 633–36 (finding that survey
respondents associate food labeled “GMO” to be less healthy, safe, or environmentally
friendly compared to other labels, including the labels “Organic” and “Natural”).
247.
See JENKINS, supra note 2, at 138–48 (passage of local GM disclosure law in
Kauai, Hawaii); Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling Laws: What Do Recent State Enactments
Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2014) (reporting that
110 bills in 32 different states were enacted in the year 2013 alone).
248.
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. Law 114-216, 130
Stat. 834 (July 29, 2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 293(e)).
249.
See, e.g., Why we Support Mandatory National GMO Labeling, CAMPBELL’S
(Jan.
7,
2016),
https://www.campbellsoupcompany.com/newsroom/news/2016/01/07/labeling/.
We’ve worked with GMA, legislators and regulators to forge a national
voluntary solution. We’ve engaged a variety of stakeholders, from lawmakers
to activists. I’ve personally made multiple trips to Capitol Hill to meet with
elected officials. Despite these efforts, Congress has not been able to resolve
this issue. We now believe that proposing a mandatory national solution is
necessary. Printing a clear and simple statement on the label is the best solution
for consumers and for Campbell.
Id.
250.
Members of the public would certainly qualify as beneficiaries of the FDA’s
regulatory system for approving food according to Professor Mendelson’s analysis. See
Mendelson, supra note 5, at 414. Thus, their concern should trigger the notice and comment
requirement.
251.
FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2016/ (last visited Jul. 18, 2018).
252.
See, e.g., FDA 1992 Guidance Document, supra note 1, at 22,984
(“Representatives of the food biotechnology industry have expressed to FDA the need for
strong but appropriate oversight by Federal agencies to ensure public confidence in foods
produced by the new techniques.”).
253.
DRUCKER, supra note 50, at 9–35, 127–66 (relationship between agribusiness
and government regarding approval of GM food); JENKINS, supra note 2, at 47–105
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apply to register GM foods or request exceptions from regulation.254 Thus, a court
might reasonably conclude that notice and comment rulemaking serves relatively
little value for these firms. The instrumental value of commentary will be satisfied
through regular channels of communication on any given issue, and the normative
value is satisfied by the firms’ ongoing relationship with the Agency. Clearly this
would not be sufficient to satisfy the APA when the FDA is issuing a definitive rule
of major significance. But a rule that is plausibly described as an interpretation of
the statute might well appear to be technical if only large firms are involved, because
it will reflect earlier communications and agreements between the agency and the
firms.
The third group of possible participants are small firms attempting to
develop GM foods or alternatives to GM foods; that is, new agricultural products
that use other breeding techniques to achieve similar or superior effects.255 As in
other fields characterized by new and rapid technological development, there
appears to be a significant number of such firms.256 In contrast to the large,
established firms, these smaller firms are often excluded from channels of
communication with the agency, sometimes because they are seen as potential
competitors to large firms that the Agency seems to favor, sometimes because they
are regarded as untrustworthy, and sometimes because they are simply unfamiliar.
In addition, the expense of obtaining approval through the FDA registration process
weighs more heavily on these smaller firms because they are more thinly capitalized,

(describing the connections between regulators and agribusiness research and productdevelopment programs); id. at 123–76 (describing cooperation between federal officials and
agribusiness firms in opposing anti-GM legislation in Hawaii); MARIE-MONIQUE ROBIN, THE
WORLD ACCORDING TO MONSANTO: POLLUTION, CORRUPTION, AND THE CONTROL OF OUR
FOOD SUPPLY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE WORLD’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL COMPANY 20–
22, 71–73 (2012) (Monsanto’s relationship with the federal government in securing approvals
for pesticides); Id. at 131–225 (Monsanto’s relationship with the federal government in
securing approvals for GM products).
254.
Biotechnology Consultations on Food from GE Plant Varieties, supra note 12
(showing 153 submissions with FDA responses, including 10 submissions from Dow (all for
insect resistant or herbicide tolerant); 73 submissions from Monsanto (the majority for
herbicide tolerant and insect or virus resistant); 4 submissions from DuPont (3 for herbicide
tolerant and/or insect resistance); 10 submissions from Syngenta (9 of which for herbicide
tolerance and/or insect resistance); and 2 from Okanagan Specialty Fruits (both for the nonbrowning apple)); see also Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status, supra note
109 (showing petitions for deregulated status from many firms). Most firms are larger
companies, such as Monsanto, Dow, and Bayer. Other mid and small firms are on the list as
well, such as Syngenta and Okanagan Specialty Fruits.
255.
E.g., ARROWHEAD MILLS, http://www.arrowheadmills.com/ (last visited July
29, 2018) (alternative flour products, such as coconut flour); CLIF BAR & CO.,
http://www.clifbar.com/ (last visited July 29, 2018) (energy bars); LAND INST.,
https://landinstitute.org/ (last visited July 29, 2018) (perennial crops, sustainable agricultural
products); SPECTRUM ORGANICS, http://www.spectrumorganics.com/ (last visited
July 29, 2018) (cooking oils and dietary supplements).
256.
See, e.g., ARCTIC APPLES, https://www.arcticapples.com/ (last visited
July 29, 2018).
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and their ability to market their products is more speculative.257 As with the
exclusion of the general public, this issue can be framed in terms of regulatory
capture—the ability of large firms to use their market power and political influence
to distort the regulatory process so that it serves their private interest. The APA’s
notice and comment procedure might then be viewed as designed to combat this
situation. But the procedure also rests on a much more general rationale. Even a
public-oriented, conscientious agency may rely on large firms for its information or
simply overlook alternative sources. If there are other firms that are likely to have
information or opinions about the subject at issue, they should be able to
communicate with the Agency before it reaches its decision.
The FDA’s decision about its regulatory strategy for GM food can be
contrasted with other regulatory decisions that might be embodied in a guidance
document. Consider again the hypothetical brochure in connection with Hoctor that
lists the locations where the report can be filed, offers a sample form that the big-cat
owners can use, provides a bibliography of sources about animal behavior and
husbandry that the owners might find relevant in obtaining the information required
for the report, and then summarizes a number of federal-court cases that determined
the adequacy of required disclosures under other statutes.258 As an instrumental
matter, these are not issues that are likely to benefit from public participation. They
involve the Agency’s own procedures and research, and are thus matters on which
the agency itself is likely to have sufficient expertise.
Use of guidance in this situation might be equally acceptable in terms of
the normative value of participation. To be sure, more participation always seems
better than less from this perspective, but participation has costs that most regulated
parties may not want to incur on a technical issue. If those parties are relatively
uniform, consisting for example of individual owners and small zoos, the Agency’s
communications with a sampling of each might satisfy any felt need for
participation. A court might well conclude that regulated parties would feel that they
had been adequately represented by the Agency’s existing contacts, and that no
further channels of participation would be necessary.
But the FDA’s decision to employ a guidance document to determine its
policy on GM food does not fit within either the instrumental or the normative
rationale that would exempt a rule from notice and comment procedure. In
instrumental terms, GM food is one of the most controversial issues facing this
controversial agency. The FDA’s guidance defines the basic regulatory structure for
a technology of vast and ever increasing proportions. Most of the largest foodproducing companies in the nation have enormous economic stakes in this

257.
Biotechnology Consultations on Food from GE Plant Varieties, supra note 12
(compare 73 submissions to the FDA from Monsanto with 2 submissions from Okanagan
Specialty Fruits); see also Petitions for Determination of Nonregulated Status, supra note 109
(compare 55 petitions submitted by Monsanto with 2 petitions submitted by Okanagan
Specialty Fruits); Strauss & Sax, supra note 125, at 475.
258.
See supra Section I.B.1.
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technology,259 and many smaller companies may thrive or fail as a result of the
FDA’s decisions in this area.260 Academic scientists who conduct research in this
field, but are unaffiliated with any of these companies, would also be motivated to
comment.261 GM food is possibly of greater concern to the general public than any
other science-based issue, aside from the colossal one of climate change. Evidence
from the Pew Study, a survey of books published on the subject, a survey of media
coverage, or any other rigorous or anecdotal test of public opinion suggests that GM
food cannot be regarded as a technical issue.262 There seems little doubt that any
significant proposal from the FDA that was promulgated through notice and
comment rulemaking would elicit an enormous number of comments. It is difficult
to believe that none of these comments would provide useful information for the
Agency; in any case, to reach that conclusion in advance is a violation of the APA.
With respect to the normative aspect of participation, the FDA’s use of
guidance is equally questionable. Large firms seem relatively satisfied with the
FDA’s reliance on a guidance document to regulate the field, at least on the basis of
the “dog-that-didn’t-bark” principle. These firms are politically influential, and
certainly capable of making their voices heard in Congress; if they were unhappy
with the current regime, it seems likely that those concerns would have appeared in
legislative proposals, perhaps even in enacted statutes.263 But the group of potential
participants in any notice and comment rulemaking regarding GM food is hardly
uniform. Small firms that are already in the field and trying to gain market share in
the field, and those that want to enter the field, have directly adverse interests to the
currently dominant firms.264 They are unlikely to be satisfied with the FDA’s current
sources of information.

259.
See, e.g., Biotechnology Consultations on Food from GE Plant Varieties,
supra note 12 (showing 73 submissions from Monsanto and 2 from Okanagan Specialty
Fruits, suggesting large agricultural giants dominate the field).
260.
See id.
261.
See, e.g., Conko et al., supra note 20.
262.
See, e.g., FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 70–71.
263.
See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. Law 114-216, §
293(a), 130 Stat. 834, 835 (July 29, 2016) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 293(e)) (directing the
Secretary of the USDA to “establish a national mandatory bioengineered food disclosure
standard with respect to any bioengineered food and any food that may be
bioengineered . . . .” within two years of the date of enactment of this law). As discussed
above, see supra note 24 and accompanying text, this law resulted from the concerns of large
food-producing companies that state government would enact separate and sometimes
demanding disclosure laws. The belief, borne out by subsequent events, was that the federal
government would not impose equivalent requirements, which is why opponents dubbed the
law “the DARK Act,” standing for “Deny Americans the Right to Know.” See supra note 112
and accompanying text.
264.
The long and expensive regulatory process keeps small players out of the field
because they may not have the resources to complete the process. A heavy regulatory process
favors large companies that have the resources to invest in an expensive regulatory process.
See, e.g., supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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Members of the public are equally unlikely to regard large agricultural
firms as representing their interests. According to the Pew Study,265 78% of those
who expressed “a great deal” of concern about GM foods thought the public itself
should play a major role in policymaking on the subject, followed by small farm
owners (73%) and scientists (66%).266 The food industry leaders who are likely to
have provided the only input to the FDA on its guidance document were seen as
desirable participants by a much smaller proportion (41%).267 Of those who
identified as having some concern about the issue, scientists came in first at 64%,
the general public and small farm owners were close behind at 61%, while food
industry leaders lagged behind once again at 43%.268 In other words, people want to
participate directly, and if there are any groups who they see as reflecting their
interests, it is scientists and small farm owners, not big agricultural firms.
A recent study of the FDA’s direct final rulemaking practice provides
additional evidence of the Agency’s misjudgment regarding the response to its
policies. As discussed above, direct final rulemaking is not the same as guidance,
but the two are related, both being techniques that use one of the exceptions to
section 553 as a means of avoiding notice and comment procedure. The study by
Professor Michael Kolber found that the FDA was required to fully withdraw 40%
of its direct final rules because those rules had elicited objections.269 In contrast, the
EPA, an agency that has been the object of at least as much controversy, was
required to withdraw fewer than 5% of its proposed rules regarding state
implementation plans, and no agency’s withdrawal rate was more than 20%—half
the FDA’s.270 The FDA’s decision to rely on guidance to set policy regarding GM
food, rather than using notice and comment rulemaking, seems to be a similar
misjudgment.
B. The Effectiveness of Guidance for GM Food Regulation
The legal requirements for regulating GM foods are established by statute;
that is, the substantive statutes authorizing the FDA and other agencies to act, and
the APA that governs the procedures for all federal agencies. It is not irrelevant,
however, to ask whether the interpretation of these statutes proposed above would
produce good public policy. The answer to the question can be taken as one
particular test, in an unarguably important case, of the desirability of the proposed
approach to guidance documents.271

265.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2.
266.
Id. at 67.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269.
Kolber, supra note 233, at 82.
270.
It should also be noted that the FDA guidance that governs its use of this
technique uses a fairly restrictive definition of the comments that require withdrawal of the
rule. See Direct Final Rule Procedures, supra note 231.
271.
Cf. All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000)
(arguing for use of notice and comment for GM foods, but for different reasons and concerns
than expressed within this Article).
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As noted in Part I, there is a fairly dramatic disconnect between the
scientific consensus regarding GM food and the prevailing views among the public.
Scientists generally agree that GM food is as safe as non-GM food and that there is
nothing about gene splicing and transfer that is inherently dangerous.272 The
American public, however, disagrees; according to the Pew Study, 39% of the
people surveyed believe that GM food is likely to cause health problems, and an
equal number believe that it poses dangers for the environment.273 This disconnect
between scientific and public opinion resembles the one that prevails in another
controversial area, namely climate change.274 The difference is that the GM food
issue lacks an obvious explanation. Daniel Kahan’s study disproved one explanation
for climate-change denial—that rejection of the scientific consensus results from
lack of knowledge about science—but offered another in its place: that the rejection
is based on political orientation.275 But the results of the Pew Study contradict both
explanations. Those who disbelieve the scientific consensus about GM food are not
only equally educated about science, but also have no particular political orientation;
the proportion of disbelievers among Democrats and Republicans is virtually

272.
See supra note 239 and accompanying text. Commentator(s) on this Article
suggest that the result of the informal rulemaking process on this topic would lead to the
classification of GM food as GRAS.
273.
FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 3–5. Also noted in this report is that
“[y]ounger adults, ages 18 to 49, are more inclined than older adults to consider organic
produce better for one’s health.” Id. at 39. This demonstrates the disconnect between science
and consumer perception because in some circumstances organic may even be more risky.
See, e.g., Avik Mukherjee et al., Preharvest Evaluation of Coliforms, Escherichia Coli,
Salmonella, and Escherichia Coli O157:H7 in Organic and Conventional Produce Grown by
Minnesota Farmers, 67 J. FOOD PROTECTION 894, 894–900 (2004).
274.
See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 89–90 (2d ed.
2011) (climate-change denial motivated by lobbying groups and political polarization);
ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE 1–47 (2015)
(climate-change denial is supported by organized interests but is largely motivated by forms
of cultural cognition); GEORGE MARSHALL, DON’T EVEN THINK ABOUT IT: WHY OUR BRAINS
ARE WIRED TO IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE 226–28 (2014) (climate-change denial results from
cognitive errors and a general inability to evaluate complex, long-term situations); GERNOT
WAGNER & MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, CLIMATE SHOCK: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A
HOTTER PLANET 80–91 (2016) (climate-change denial is based on people’s inability to
evaluate the scope of risk); Daniel Kahan et al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy
and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 733
(2012) (climate-change denial motivated by political orientation, not level of science
literacy); Edward L. Rubin, Rejecting Climate Change: Not Science Denial, but Regulation
Phobia, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 103, 106 (2016) (climate-change denial is motivated by
adverse reaction to regulatory consequences of addressing the crisis). Wagner and Weitzman
compare climate change with GM foods, pointing out that people react as strongly to the
minimal risk of environmental contamination by these foods as they do to the oncoming
catastrophe of climate change. In other words, concern, as well as denial, is not realistically
adjusted to actual risk. WAGNER & WEITZMAN, supra, at 90.
275.
Kahan et al., supra note 274, at 733.
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identical.276 There is also no correlation on the basis of age, race, or income.277 There
is a significant, but delimited, one on the basis of gender, but that itself demands an
explanation rather than offering one.278
An even greater oddity, perhaps, is that 78% of those surveyed by Pew
trusted scientists “a lot” or “some.”279 Small farmers scored equally well, but the
media scored considerably lower (45%), and elected officials scored much lower
(25%).280 Moreover, 63% of those surveyed thought that scientists understood the
health effects of GM foods “very well” or “fairly well.”281 But only 14% of those
surveyed knew that “almost all” scientists believe that GM foods are safe to eat.282
In other words, fully 86% of those surveyed were unaware of the scientific
consensus regarding GM foods, even though most people trusted scientists and
believed that they understood the issues.283 This suggests that there is real value in
open debate about GM foods. The majority of Americans, it appears, are ready to
listen to scientists on this issue and seem willing to be educated about the subject.
Factors that often impede people’s willingness to think rationally about an issue in
substantive terms, such as race, religion, income level, and political orientation, do
not seem to have much influence in this case.284
The notice and comment process for federal regulations, to be sure, is
unlikely to be a major factor in shaping public opinion. Elected officials, the news
media, and even entertainment products will almost certainly affect people’s views
more profoundly. But the debate about the actions of federal regulators, and most
importantly about the FDA’s general regulatory approach, could well produce
incremental effects, either directly or through media coverage. Given the scientific
consensus, it would seem that any public debate, in whatever arena, could only have
beneficial effects in moving the public to a better understanding of the issue, and
thus toward more rational attitudes.
The policy effect involving small, innovative companies that are seeking
to enter the GM market would likely be more definitive. The FDA’s current
regulatory stance creates serious barriers of entry into the GM food industry.285
Depending on how many agencies a firm may need to petition or voluntarily consult,
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FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 50, 57. Most dramatically, the percentage
of self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans who expressed great concern
about GM food was identical, at 16%, and the percentage who expressed some concern,
virtually identical, at 39% and 34% respectively. Id. at 8, 53.
277.
Id. at 53.
278.
Id. The explanation offered by the authors of the study is that women are more
skeptical of technological innovation, but this is based only on the results of other studies. Id.
at 56.
279.
Id. at 61.
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Id.
281.
Id. at 60.
282.
Id. at 59.
283.
Id.
284.
Id. at 53.
285.
Strauss & Sax, supra note 125, at 475.
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the process currently requires ten years to bring a new GM product to market.286
This may be an annoying burden for companies such as Monsanto or Dow, but it
functions as a preclusion for small firms with limited access to capital. Experience
in other high-tech industries suggests that many of the real innovations originate
with small firms, even if these innovations are ultimately marketed by larger ones.
The notice and comment process would give these firms a voice; their participation
is a certainty, and might well alert the Agency to the benefits of allowing greater
access to the market. Perhaps the FDA is already alert to this issue but has been
captured by the giant agribusiness firms.287 If so, notice and comment would help
alert the public and the courts to this situation and might ultimately lead to the same
advantages for smaller firms.288

CONCLUSION
The public reaction to GM food is anomalous in several ways. In a society
that generally relies on science at the policy level and readily accepts its innovations
at the personal one, people continue to reject the consensus among scientists that
GM food is safe and express serious doubts about its effects on both personal health
and the general environment. Moreover, this rejection of scientific conclusions does
not resemble other examples of science rejection in our society—most notably with
respect to climate change and evolution—which are correlated with a set of political
or ideological views. In fact, people generally express confidence in scientists’
conclusions about GM food; survey data suggests that people simply do not know
what those conclusions are. Over the past two decades, an enormous amount of
money has supported an anti-GM food movement, the impact of which may not
necessarily be quantified but cannot be ignored. A future investigation might also
inquire as to how much the anti-GM movement has impacted regulation in this area.
The regulatory response to GM food seems to follow a more familiar
pattern, at least if one is inclined to be critical of regulation from either a
conservative or liberal perspective.289 The FDA has established a regulatory regime
that generally allows GM food to be marketed only after a time consuming and
expensive regulatory process. To conservatives, this represents an excessive burden
of both expense and delay on legitimate and beneficial commerce. To liberals, it is
a familiar story of regulatory capture, where the agency is in regular contact with
286.
See Prado et al., supra note 124, at 770.
287.
Another concern is whether regulators are captured by the strong anti-GM
groups. But the Agency should have expertise to separate comments based on science versus
comments based on anti-science.
288.
While this Article focuses on crops, a similar controversy is occurring in the
regulation of genetically engineered animals. In January 2017, the FDA issued a draft
guidance on the regulation of genetically engineered animals. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
REGULATION OF INTENTIONALLY ALTERED GENOMIC DNA IN ANIMALS, No. 187 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guid
anceforIndustry/UCM113903.pdf. This draft guidance also faced opposition by scientists
well-steeped in this field. See Amy Maxmen, Gene-Edited Animals Face US Regulatory
Crackdown, NATURE (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nature.com/news/gene-edited-animalsface-us-regulatory-crackdown-1.21331.
289.
“Liberal” in the sense of political progressive of course. Philosophical
liberalism is allied with political conservatism.
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the large companies that dominate the field and designs its policies to favor the
interests of those companies over those of less powerful competitors or the general
public.
Clearly, the public and regulatory responses elicit deep questions about our
governmental system—both its democratic reliance on public opinion and its
technocratic reliance on administrative expertise. The particular practices of the
regulatory agencies assigned to address this issue are unlikely to overcome or
resolve such general concerns. But to the extent that its particularized decisions can
produce at least marginal or incremental effects, the FDA’s decision to regulate GM
foods through the controversial mechanism of guidance seems to be a poor one.
Guidance is an important regulatory tool. Giving it a name, partly
mistranslated from Japanese, underemphasizes the generality and value of informal,
flexible communication by agencies in the regulatory process. Courts and
commentators, however, have struggled to determine when its use is permitted by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs the federal regulatory
process. Two tests have been proposed thus far: whether the communication or
guidance is only an interpretation of an existing statutory or regulatory rule rather
than a new rule in itself, and whether the communication exercises a binding effect
on private parties. If a court finds that the communication is not interpretive or
creates a binding effect, it generally does not conclude that the communication itself
is impermissible, but rather that it can only be effectuated through the APA’s
“informal” rulemaking process, its standard—i.e., formal—means of establishing
new rules that bind the public. This means that the Agency must act through the
APA’s notice and comment procedure.
This Article argues that neither the interpretation test nor the bindingness
test is a useful way to determine whether the APA requires that an agency
communication or guidance should be subject to the informal rulemaking process;
neither test captures the real concerns about an agency’s use of informal
communication. The preferable test is derived from the remedy that would be
imposed; namely, whether the notice and comment process should be required in the
particular case. Notice and comment is designed to enable a wide range of
participants, from both the general public and specially interested individuals or
entities, to make their views known to an agency before an agency reaches a
decision. This Article argues that notice and comment should be required when these
participants—i.e. anyone with whom the agency is not in regular contact—might
have useful information or merely be interested in participating.
According to this test, the FDA’s reliance on guidance to regulate GM
foods is inadvisable because the issue is a highly controversial one. While the FDA
is exposed to the view of large agribusiness firms through regular contact and their
requests for exceptions from the Agency’s requirements, it has failed to receive
sufficient input from members of the general public and from small firms developing
GM foods. There can be little question that both these groups are highly motivated
to participate. GM is one of the most controversial issues in contemporary society,
and it is a fluid, rapidly developing area of technological innovation that attracts
many small-scale entrepreneurs. That should be sufficient for purposes of reaching
a decision under the APA.
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This Article also argues that participation by the public and smaller GM
developers might have a beneficial impact on the quality of regulation; that is, the
social results that it produces. It might produce somewhat-greater public
understanding of the scientific consensus regarding GM food, thereby reducing
irrational fears about its safety. It might make the FDA more aware of the needs of
smaller firms and the benefits that they might offer, or at least compel the Agency
to defend the burdens it imposes on these firms. This is not to say that notice and
comment procedure is a panacea or even a major influence on public policy. But it
is the device that administrative agencies have available to them at present, and it
should be used when it is appropriate to do so.

